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"There will always be great difficulty in fixing a line, beyond which
the water in the sands and gravels over which a stream flows, and
which supply or uphold the stream, ceases' to be a part thereof and
becomes what is called 'percolating water.""

I. INTRODUCTION
It must seem surprising to people elsewhere that California, unlike
other western states, continues to treat surface water and groundwater

under separate and distinct legal regimes, even though everyone today
acknowledges that water comprises a continuum through which the
water moves wherever gravity takes it.2 Moreover, whatever "mystery"
there once was about the movement of water underground, and that
induced lawmakers and treatise writers to eschew efforts to regulate
groundwater, is no longer a hindrance to modern management, as
most states have acknowledged. What, then, explains California's
failure to bring its water law into line with contemporary knowledge,
and with scientific reality? The answer (actually there are two answers)

is not very mysterious.
First, while California extensively regulates surface water by an
administrative permit system, groundwater is effectively unregulated.
People who have access to groundwater can just pump it. They need
no one's permission, and no one regulates their use. Water users like
it this way; groundwater is a sort of ace-in-the-hole. When surface
water supplies are restricted, they can pump groundwater as a
substitute, and so it functions as one form of insulation against both
drought and increasing regulation. One may wonder why surface
water users tolerate this situation, since a good deal of groundwater
1. Hudson v. Dailey, 105 P. 748, 753 (Cal. 1909).
2. To hydrogeologists, water is a continuum. The same water may sometimes be
found on the surface of the earth and at other times underground. Water moves by
the force of gravity, and whether it is surface water or groundwater at any particular
moment depends on the slope (known as gradient) and direction of the medium
through which it is moving at a given moment, on obstacles it encounters, and on the
topography of the land. Moreover, from a technical perspective, the distinction
between percolating groundwater and subterranean streams is meaningless, or nearly
so. Water that actually flows like a surface stream beneath the earth's surface, as in
lava tubes or limestone caverns, is very rare in California. Virtually all underground
water percolates through the ground. It may move more or less rapidly; it may be
moving parallel or perpendicular to a surface stream; it may be narrowly confined or
broadly diffused underground. From a geological perspective, these factors are simply
crude and partial descriptions of the enormously varied behavioral characteristics of
subsurface water, depending on a variety of factors, such as the varied transmissivity of
the material in which it is found, the varied obstacles it encounters, and the diverse
gradients over which it travels in its movement through the earth. In addition, at
various points in time or space, groundwater may be in hydraulic connection with a
surface stream, or it may be confined, at least for some distance, beneath a quite
impermeable layer. Water underground may, at one place, or during one season, seep
into a river through its banks (a gaining river), and at another place or time seep out
from the banks into the underground (a losing river). It all depends on whether the
saturated area of the ground is above or below the riverbank at that point.
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pumping draws on waters tributary to surface supplies, and diminishes
them. It is a good question, and there is no obvious answer to it. Of
course, a great many surface water users are also groundwater
pumpers, so they may receive both benefits and detriments from the
existing situation. Probably the most plausible answer is that water
users of all stripes dislike the existing regulatory system, and feel the
less regulation, the better.
Second, California does have a fairly well developed response
system when a basin finds itself in crisis, which undoubtedly relieves
the pressure to reform the system globally. A number of Southern
California basins have been the subjects of litigation leading to the
development of more-or-less comprehensive management schemes.'
Usually overpumping leading to water table decline, saltwater
intrusion, and shortages has stimulated such adjudications or
settlements. While the arrangements vary widely, often a management
entity is created that can limit pumping, and/or impose charges for
excess pumping, purchase substitute water, recharge depleted
aquifers, initiate conjunctive use arrangements, and so on. Such
arrangements have staved off the sort of crisis that has led elsewhere to
systemwide reform of traditional groundwater legal regimes.
California has also tried to empower local agencies to implement
modern groundwater management on a local or regional basis, but the
laws with which it has done this (though of some use) are too limited
to solve the problem. 4
While California has a system in place that averts crisis and system
collapse, it continues to suffer a variety of dysfunctional results
growing out of a system that is at odds with hydrologic reality. One
example that has drawn a good deal of attention recently arises from
assertions that groundwater pumpers are depriving streams of water
needed to meet downstream environmental flow requirements, even
though regulated surface water users are meeting the bypass flow
requirements that have been imposed on them. Such newer concerns
about groundwater pumping, at the behest of interests outside the
traditional water-using constituencies, has generated new controversy
over what had been an almost-forgotten byway of California water law,
the so-called "subterranean stream" exception.
In a legal regime like California's, where groundwater and surface
water are treated differently, the question obviously arose as to
whether any water that was not visible on the surface should be
considered, legally speaking, to be groundwater. The answer lawyers
always gave was "no." First, they said, some water that moves directly
underneath a river in its bed, though beneath the surface, is really just
a component of the river. It would be inappropriate to allow someone
to sink a well in the riverbed and take such water (as groundwater) to
the obvious detriment of downstream surface users. Moreover, they
3. See generally WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING
GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992).

THE

WATERS:

4. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10753.9, 10754 (West Supp. 2003).
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reasoned, groundwater is only treated separately because we do not
understand its "mysterious" movements.
But if a river, whose
movements are known and knowable, is flowing under the surface,
either as the underftow just described, or through a limestone cavern
as a true stream, it should be treated like any other river on the
surface. Thus, the experts concluded, a river, or component thereof,
though found beneath the surface, should be treated like any other
stream.
The result of this traditional reasoning was to create three
different categories of water: (1) surface streams, which were subject to
permitting and regulation; (2) groundwater - usually called
"percolating groundwater" - which was unregulated; and (3)
"subterranean streams," which were treated the same as surface
streams.
As controversy arose in recent years over the asserted adverse
impact of unregulated groundwater pumping, it was urged that the
"subterranean stream" category be re-examined and interpreted more
broadly so as to enlarge the scope of permitting and regulation over
pumping that was affecting instream values. To put the matter simply,
on one side it was urged that subterranean stream water be limited to
what is usually called underflow or subflow, that is, the water in the
immediate environs of a surface stream and flowing along with it,
though beneath the surface.'
The other side urged that it be
expanded to encompass much if not all the groundwater physically
tributary to a surface stream (under the theory that everything within
the relatively impermeable surroundings of a surface stream be
considered its bed and banks, and thus part of the stream).
I should emphasize at the outset that the terms and categories,
such as "underflow," are utilized in statutes and judicial opinions. 6 As
a legal term, underftow has been defined in various ways. It is said to
5. The term "underflow," though commonly used in the law, is not a technical
term of art used by hydrogeologists. Scientists draw no hydrological line of
demarcation between groundwater that is percolating toward a stream, and
groundwater that has become part of the stream as "underftow." As the Arizona
Department of Water Resources has explained:
In the ideal, subflow [or underftow] can be visualized as just another part of
the stream that lies out of view below the surface. As part of the stream, it
also has distinct bed and banks which define its extent.
This ideal concept of subflow actually does exist in narrow bedrock
canyon streams where both the surface and subsurface components of the
streams are contained within hardrock boundaries. But as these bedrock
canyons descend from the mountains, the valleys become alluvial valleys
between mountain ranges, where the subterranean component of streams
becomes unbounded.
ARIZONA DEP'T OF WATER RES., TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT
INTERLOcUTORY APPEAL ISSUE No. 2 OPINION, IN RE. THE GENERAL ADJUDICATION OF THE

GILA RIVER SYSTEM AND SOURCE 38 (1993).

6. In addition, as noted hereafter in the text, the term has been commonly picked
up from headnote nine in City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 586 (Cal. 1899), and
in Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314 (1903), and is often cited in a way that gives an
inaccurate sense both of the trial judge's instructions, and the Supreme Court's
decision, in that case.
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be water "in the soil, sand, and gravel composing the bed of the
[stream] "7which "support[s] the surface stream in its natural state"8 or
"feed[s] it directly."9 The 1899 decision in City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy
is cited for the view that underftow requires the surface and subsurface
be in contact and that the subsurface flow shall have a definite
An additional,
direction corresponding to the surface flow.'0
commonly cited definition of underflow is taken from Wells A.
Hutchins:
The underftow or subflow of a surface stream consists of water in the
soil, sand, and gravel immediately below the bed of the open stream,
which supports the surface stream in its natural state or feeds it

directly.
To constitute underflow, it is essential that the surface and subsurface
flows be in contact and that the subsurface flow shall have a definite
direction corresponding to the surface flow.

The underftow may include the water moving not only in the loose,
porous material that underlies the bed of the surface stream, but also
the lateral extensions of the water-bearing material on each side of
the surface channel. But it must be moving in a course and confined

within a space reasonably well defined, so that the existence and
general direction of the body of water moving underground may be
determined with reasonable accuracy.

"percolating
streams,"
and
"subterranean
"Underflow,"
groundwater," bear little, if any, relationship to geological realities.
Indeed, these water law terms are geographic conceptions
fundamentally at odds with science's understanding of water's
movement. The legal categories seem to assume, for example, that
there is a fixed space within which water is the underlow of a stream,
From a
and beyond that space the water is something else.
hydrogeological perspective, such geographic categories are inapt, and
efforts to fit water into the law's categories by using these technicalsounding classifications give the enterprise a somewhat daffy air. Is the
water moving parallel to the stream, or perpendicular to it? Is the
aquifer more like a lake in shape, or more like a river? Is water
percolating through the ground rapidly enough to be treated as
"flowing" water? Nonetheless, the presence of laws using such terms
and concepts require them to be taken seriously, and given some
meaning.
7. Verdugo Canon Water Co.v. Verdugo, 93 P. 1021, 1025 (Cal. 1908).
8. Huffner v. Sawday, 94 P. 424, 427 (Cal. 1908).
9. City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 787 (Cal. 1921).
10. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 594.
11. WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAw OF WATER RIGHTS 422 (1956)
(citations omitted).
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The interpretive format for dealing with this puzzle in California is
a provision of section 1200 of the Water Code, which identifies the
scope of jurisdiction of the State Water Resources Control Board
("Board"), the state's water permitting and regulatory agency. 2 That
section states, "[w]henever the terms stream, lake or other body of
water, or water occurs in relation to applications to appropriate water
or permits or licenses issued pursuant to such applications, such term
refers only to surface water, and to subterranean streams flowing
through known and definite channels."13 In an effort to resolve the
dispute over how to interpret section 1200, the Board requested a
review and report on the legislative history of the provision and the
administrative and judicial precedents under it. 4 The pages that
follow are a shortened version of that report. Because the history of
California's efforts to deal with the subterranean stream question
turned out to tell a more richly complex story than anyone expected, it
is edited and offered here, with the thought that it may be of interest
to anyone wanting to understand the evolution of western water law.
The report on which this article is based was done under a single,
straightforward assumption. That assumption was that the statutory
provision in question, section 1200, was enacted to achieve some
legislative purpose, and that however unscientific or outdated the
statutory language may be, it is nonetheless likely the legislators had
some real problem in mind. As will become clear in the pages that
follow, those who drafted the 1913 legislation that became today's
Water Code section 1200 were not ignorant of the interactive
relationship between groundwater and surface water. They knew
perfectly well that much percolating groundwater was on its way to or
from a surface stream, and they knew that water appeared,
disappeared, and reappeared on the surface as streams flowed. The
questions addressed here are these: what were the drafters of that
provision of the law trying to accomplish, and what would be required
to implement their intent today?

12. The provision of section 1200 of the California Water Code, set out here,
defines the scope of Board authority for those provisions in Part II of the Water Code
that require Board approval of diversions from a stream, lake, or other body of water.
There are other important distinctions, but they are not within the scope of this
article, e.g., riparian uses require no permit, CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 1971),
and percolating groundwater is not subject to statutory adjudications, Id. § 2500.
13. Id. § 1200.
14. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX, REVIEW OF THE LAWS ESTABLISHING THE SWRCB's
PERMITTING AUTHORITY OVER APPROPRIATIONS OF GROUNDWATER CLASSIFIED AS
SUBTERRANEAN STREAMS AND THE SWRCB's IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE LAWS No. 0-076-

300-0 (2002).
15. The original language read "[w]henever the terms stream, stream system, lake
or other body of water or water occurs in this act, such term shall be interpreted to
refer only to surface water, and to subterranean streams flowing through known and
definite channels." Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 42, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012,
1033.
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II. THE JUDICIAL BACKGROUND OF THE WATER
COMMISSION ACT
A. THE POMEROYCASE

It has always been an article of faith among California lawyers that16
one has to look to the 1899 decision in City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy
for legal guidance in deciding whether certain subsurface waters are,
or are not, a subterranean stream under California law.1 7 Before
turning to that much-cited case, a few preliminary comments are in
order. First, the Pomeroy decision is not legally binding precedent.
The court decided it prior to the enactment of the governing statute18
and its predecessor provision, and, therefore, it does not represent the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislature's intent in enacting
the Water Commission Act in 1913. Second, Pomeroy has been more
often plucked for its quotable language than studied for its meaning
and context (many commentators quote the language of its headnotes
rather than the text of the opinion), and at least some of what has
been attributed to it over the years is misleading. Third, any effort to
ascertain the significance of Pomeroy to the 1913 law needs to take
account of subsurface water law developments in the California
Supreme Court between 1899 and 1913. Fourth, and finally, it is
important to understand what the legislature was trying to do when it
enacted the statutory provision in question, rather than just assuming
it meant to codify the Pomeroy opinion. The following section
considers each of these matters, because the Pomeroy case itself had an
interesting history.
Pomeroy was an eminent domain valuation case. 9 In order to
improve its municipal water supply system, Los Angeles had
condemned a narrow strip of land comprising 315 acres, averaging
some quarter-mile in width, adjacent to the Los Angeles River just

16. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585 (Cal. 1899); Hooker v. Los Angeles,
188 U.S. 314 (1903).
17. For example, the Department of Water Resources stated that "[t]he appropriate
legal test to be applied in distinguishing between percolating water and subterranean
streams was set forth by the California Supreme Court in Los Angeles v. Pomeroy more

than 100 years ago." Dep't of Water Res., Statement of the Department of Water
Resources at the State Water Resources Control Board Workshop 1 (April 24, 2000)
(transcript on file with the author). "In determining the legal classification of
groundwater, the State Board and its predecessors have relied on the California
Supreme Court 1899 decision in Los Angeles versus Pomeroy which established the
distinction between subterranean streams and percolating groundwater."

Erin

Mahaney, Address at State Water Resources Control Board Public Workshop,
Subterranean Stream Flowing Through Known and Definite Channels 6 (April 24,
2000) (transcript on file with the author).
18. CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971). "This article shall not be construed to
authorize the board to regulate groundwater in any manner." CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1221 (West Supp. 2003). As this provision makes clear, under the California Water
Code a "subterranean stream flowing through known and definite channels" is not
legally considered "groundwater." CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971).
19. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 586.
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above where it passes through the narrows out of the San Fernando
Valley, between the eastern extremity of the Cahuenga Mountains and
the Verdugo hills."0 The question in the case was how to value the land
taken. It was determined that Los Angeles had a paramount pueblo
right to the water of the Los Angeles River. 1 If the water beneath the
condemned land was water of the Los Angeles River, the city was
entitled to it and the condemnation award could not include the sales
value of the water under the land for use elsewhere.2" Notably, the
case had nothing to do with state regulatory jurisdiction over
groundwater. The question was simply whether the water beneath the
defendants' land was part of the Los Angeles River (Los Angeles wins),
or whether it was part and parcel of the condemned land (defendants
win)

23

The physical situation in the case was that the water of the Los
Angeles River had its source in the mountains surrounding the San
Fernando Valley; water that went underground into the alluvium of
the valley, and then by gravity flow, found its way to the river.24 The
court acknowledged that all, or virtually all, the groundwater from the
San Fernando Valley watershed found its way into the Los Angeles
River.25 The defendants' land lay on both sides of the river, and the
subsurface water beneath it was "in intimate contact" with the surface
flow, and flowing in the same direction at a rate about 1/1000 the rate
of the surface stream.2 The court held the evidence sustained a
finding this subsurface flow was a subterranean stream.2 7 The bulk of
the court's opinion examines the question whether the law, with
respect to subterranean streams, was correctly stated in the trial
judge's instructions to the jury.
Because the narrow question in the case was whether the
subsurface water in question was part of the Los Angeles River, the
instructions dealt with evidence of whether the water underground was
an immediate subsurface element of the river, what is usually called
underftow. For example, the trial judge told the jury that if it found

20. Id. at 586-87.
21. Id. at 600.
22. Id. at 591.

23. Id.
24. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 586-87.
25. Id. at 591.
26. The court said the surface stream flowed "at the rate of 2 or 3 feet per second,"
and the subsurface flow was "14 to 17 miles per [year]." See id. This was probably a
misstatement. "Pomeroy... estimated.., groundwater was flowing... 200 to 250 feet
per day .... Groundwater flows a few feet per day." Dennis E. Williams, Statement at
State Water Resources Control Board Public Workshop, Subterranean Stream Flowing
Through Known and Definite Channels 57 (April 24, 2000) (transcript on file with
author).
27. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 592.
28. In defining underflow, reference is usually made to the elements mentioned in
instruction 16 in the Pomeroy decision which stated that groundwater must be

connected to the surface stream, flow in the same direction as the surface stream, be
confined to a reasonably well-defined space, and be moving in a course. Id. at 594.

Issue 2

CALIFORNIA LEGAL HISTORY

the water moving underground was "in the same general direction as
the surface stream, and in connection with it,"2 then the water should
be considered as part of the watercourse. That instruction, and its
approval by the supreme court, does not decide one way or another
whether the presence of subsurface water flowing in the same
direction as the surface stream is a necessary element of any
subterranean stream, only that it is a sufficient element.30 There is,
however, at least one thing the court does make clear: nothing in the
case was intended as a determination that all tributary underground
water should be classified as a subterranean part of the river to which it
is tributary.'
Taken all in all, Pomeroy can be read broadly or narrowly, and
neither reading can be said definitively to be right or wrong. The case
itself deals only with the underftow of a gaining stream,32 but purports
29. Id.
30. Pomeroy quoted, in its entirety, section 48 from Kinney's first edition. Id. at 598
(CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 48, at 69-70 (W. H.
Loudermilk & Co. 1894) [hereinafter KINNEY I]). Kinney, a lawyer, pictured the
subterranean stream in quite formal and conceptual terms, quite at variance even with
the scientific knowledge of his own time, notions which he spelled out at length in his
second edition. 2 CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 1161, at
2106-07 (2d ed. Bender-Moss Co. 1912) [hereinafter KINNEY II]. He included known
and unknown, dependent and independent, subterranean streams. Underflow is the
classic example of what he calls a known, dependent subterranean stream. Id. at 2106.
While what Kinney had primarily in mind were simply the subsurface elements of
more-or-less perennial surface streams, according to him, a subterranean stream may
also be entirely independent of any surface stream, so long as it ascertainably has the
channel-like characteristics of surface streams. Such flows, which Kinney calls
"independent [of surface] streams" may be identified by "the topographical features of
the country." Id. § 1165, at 2117 (citing McClintock v. Hudson, 74 P. 849, 850 (Cal.
1903)).
31. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 597. As the issue is sometimes raised whether the legal
definition of a subterranean stream might embrace the whole of California's immense
Central Valley or any other broad alluvial valley enclosed by mountains and thus
arguably having a bed and banks, the instructions in Pomeroy are striking. Having just
described a "watercourse," as above, the trial judge goes on to say that "[wiater moving
by force of gravity in a valley or basin of wide extent.. . and moving generally through
the hole [sic] or through a large portion of the basin ... composed of alluvial or other
deposit lying throughout the entire basin ... do not constitute a watercourse .... " Id.
at 595. The supreme court underlines this point, noting that the trial judge:
[W]as not giving, or intending to give, a definition which would make the
whole San Fernando basin a subterranean stream. The instructions.., are
applicable ... exclusively to the comparatively narrow outlet of the
valley ... between the rocky and comparatively impervious mountain sides on
either hand... [including] water moving in a definite direction ... [and]
sides and bed to the channel in which it is moving.
Id. at 597. Well before Pomeroy, California court cases had decided to reject integrated
management of surface and groundwater, even where knowledge of the hydrological
impact was clear and undisputed, Gould v. Eaton, 44 P. 319, 320 (Cal. 1896), and
despite a view that such a rule was not required by precedent, and was unwise, S. Pac.
R.R. v. Dufour, 30 P. 783, 784 (Cal. 1892). Explicit reference to these precedents in
Pomeroy makes clear that the Pomeroy court was not seeking to use the subterranean
stream category to bring about integration of surface rights with uses of tributary
groundwater.
32. There seem to be no early cases finding a subterranean stream that involved
anything other than underftow. For example, only a few months after the Pomeroy
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to set out more generally "the proper definition of a subterranean
stream," which it does by quoting from Clesson Kinney's treatise on
the law of irrigation.33 In so doing, it employs terms that are capable of
differing interpretations, but which the court either does not define,
or defines ambiguously. For example, the court does not indicate
what sort of movement is required for subsurface water to be "flowing,"
a matter of some importance since virtually all groundwater is in
motion to some extent. It says a channel must be "defined," and
defined means "contracted and bounded,0 4 but it does not further
define those terms. Whatever contracted and bounded means, the
court acknowledged in the Pomeroy case the contracted and bounded
area was as much as two and one half miles in width,35 which is hardly
what most people would think of as a contracted channel. Moreover,
one is left unsure whether it is essential to the decision that within
such a channel "there was a subsurface flow corresponding [that is,
parallel] with the surface flow..

.

,,6 If so, that would significantly

narrow the potential for a broad area of an alluvial valley to qualify as a
contracted and bounded channel. As to the "sides and bed" to the
channel,37 the court describes them as "comparatively impervious,"
giving no further definition to that characterization.
The plain fact is that while the outcome in Pomeroy, in favor of Los
Angeles, made good sense, the decision's legal effort to define a part
of the groundwater continuum as a "subterranean stream" was both a
hydrogeological and public policy fiasco.
Virtually everyone
acknowledges this. What is less often noted is that the California
Supreme Court soon abandoned the Pomeroy test. In fact, it is almost
certainly the case that the Pomeroy court itself realized the subterranean
stream category it had fashioned was an unfit tool for water
management (though it continues to be cited and relied on
uncritically by the Board today) .39After all, the judges in the Pomeroy
decision, the court held that the subterranean flow in the bed of the San Gabriel River
was underflow constituting a subterranean stream, and not percolating water that
belonged to the owner of the soil. Vineland Irrigation Dist. v.Azusa Irrigating Co., 58
P. 1057, 1059-60 (Cal. 1899).
33. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 598 (quoting KINNEY I, supra note 30, at 69-70).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 597.
36. Id. at 598.
37.

Id. at 597.

38. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 597. Despite the common use of the word "impermeability" in
discussions of the Pomeroy case rule, neither the instructions, nor the California
Supreme Court opinion used that word. The court attributes to the trial court a

standard of"a well-defined channel, with impervious sides and banks," though the word
"impervious" never appears in the trial court's instructions. Id. (emphasis added).
The trial court said only that the sides and banks "may consist of any material which
has the effect of confining the waters within circumscribed limits." Id. at 594
(instruction 15). In any event, the court then describes the channel as being the
"comparatively impervious mountain sides on either hand." Id. at 597.
39. See Decision Determining the Legal Classification of Groundwater in the Pauma

& Pala Basins of the San Luis Rey River, 2002 WL 31441222, at *3 (Cal. State Water
Res. Bd. Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Decision 1645].
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case were perfectly well aware the water in the Los Angeles River, its
underfiow, and the rest of the surface and subsurface water in the San
Fernando Valley, was part of a single, continuous system. The Pomeroy
Court acknowledged that fact explicitly."
It knew full well the
percolating water outside of the acreage in the case was on its way to
those lands where it would be magically transformed into subterranean
stream water. Why, then, did it write the opinion it did? After all,
unlike today's administrative agencies and courts, it had no
subterranean stream language in a statute it was obliged to interpret
and implement. The court was making law in the common law
tradition.
B. THE POMEROY CASE IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The traditional common law definition of subterranean streams4
was very narrow and essentially limited to flows in limestone regions. 1
Why didn't the court in Pomeroy leave it at that, and instead adopt a
common sense test based on whether the water in question was
tributary to the surface river, and whether its pumping would adversely
affect the rights Los Angeles held in the river? That would have been a
straightforward, hydrologically and legally rational approach, and
would have avoided the need to wrestle with the unwieldy concept of a
subterranean stream.
We now know the answer. It was provided a few years later by the
trial judge in Pomeroy, Lucien Shaw. Shaw subsequently became a
Justice of the California Supreme Court, and wrote several important
groundwater opinions, including the decision in Katz v. Walkinshaw.
The explanation is ironic in the extreme, because the justification for
what the court did in Pomeroy, and for the rule it fashioned - which still
dominates California groundwater law a century later - was repudiated
by the California Supreme Court in 1903." Why did the court do what
it did, and what happened next? The answer is fascinating.
In 1899, when Pomeroy was decided, it was still widely believed that
the common law doctrine of absolute ownership was the law governing
groundwater in California.44 Under that doctrine, a landowner could
pump and bear no responsibility for the impact on other pumpers,
however great the damage to them, so long as he was not actuated by
malice. 5 Indeed, the trial judge, in his instructions in Pomeroy, drew on
40. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 595.
41. The conventional cases spoke of those genuine underground flows "in
limestone regions," and the courts recognized that "[u] nderground currents of such a
description are exceptional in their nature ....
Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 84 Am. Dec.
511,513 (Pa. 1863).

42. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
43. Id. at 770.
44. SeeCity of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 787 (Cal. 1921).

45. The English common law rule for groundwater is generally traced back to the
1843 decision in Acton v. BlundelL Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Ex.
Ch. 1843). Chasemore v. Richards recognized a subterranean stream exception to this
rule, but the presence of such streams was considered quite exceptional. 1 Engl. Rul.
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the decision in Hanson v. McCue,4" a California case that cited absolute
ownership as the governing rule for groundwater.
If absolute

ownership was the law governing groundwater, Los Angeles would only
be secure in its rights in the Los Angeles River if the water in question
was a "subterranean stream," and thus not subject to the law governing
groundwater. The assumption that absolute ownership was the law
governing groundwater created the need, in Pomeroy, for a

subterranean stream doctrine. 48 The irony of Pomeroy is that absolute
ownership was not the law in California after all, though the court was

not to so rule until several years after deciding Pomeroy.
Though the Pomeroy court understood the hydrological realities
in the case before it, it accepted the premise that underlay Judge
Shaw's instructions: percolating groundwater was subject to the
absolute ownership rule.50 On that premise, either Los Angeles had to
lose a case that the court undoubtedly believed the city deserved to
win, or the court had to look to a legal theory that solved the
immediate problem before it, but created a hydrologically untenable

distinction among groundwater at different stages of its voyage
through the San Fernando Valley. The Pomeroy court chose to decide
in favor of a result that protected Los Angeles' treasury at the expense
of a coherent legal theory. Since Pomeroy did not actually involve a
dispute over the use of the water itself, it left to another day the
question how much protection Los Angeles would be given against

pumpers generally in the San Fernando Valley, that is, how much
tributary groundwater would be found to be "subterranean stream"
water.

Cas. 729, 754 (Ex. Ch. 1859).
46. 42 Cal. 303 (1871).
47. The Hanson case seems to be the first California decision to use the sort of
formulation that appeared in Pomeroy and then later showed up in California statutory
law. "[A] subterranean stream of a defined character, and flowing in a defined
channel." Id. at 308. It is perhaps worth noting that in its characterization of
subterranean streams, the court in Hanson seems to have had in mind something
much more like a true river underground. "Underground currents of water.., are
known to exist in considerable volume, particularly in limestone regions." Id. But
"[I]imestone in California is insignificant as a water-bearing formation." CAL. DEP'T OF
WATER RES., BULLETIN No. 118 CALIFORNIA'S GROUND WATER 15 (Sept. 1975).
"[D]efinite underground streams are few and of rare occurrence ....
2 SAMUEL C.
WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN TH4E WESTERN STATES § 1077, at 1011-12 (3d ed. 1911).
48. Hanson, 42 Cal. at 309. To be sure, any jurisdiction that had separate legal
regimes for groundwater and surface water (even if absolute ownership was not the
groundwater rule), had to have some way to draw a line between what was
groundwater and what was surface water. It was early recognized that some water,
though physically beneath the surface of the earth, was functionally so much part and
parcel of the surface stream that it was prudent, not to say essential, to manage it
integrally with the surface stream. But, as we shall see, that did not mean one needed
the artifice of a "subterranean stream" doctrine such as that fashioned by Kinney. See
text accompanying note 30.
49. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903).
50. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 594 (Cal. 1899).

Issue 2

CALIFORNIA LEGAL HISTORY

C. DOING THEJOB POMEROYFAILED TO DO: KATZ V. WALKINSHAWAND
Los ANGELES V. HUNTER

Only four years after the Pomeroy decision, the California Supreme
Court decided a far more famous case, Katz v. Walkinshaw.5 The facts
were simple enough. The plaintiff was pumping groundwater and
using it on his overlying land, and the defendant was pumping
groundwater from under his nearby land, and taking it off the
overlying land for use. 2 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's
pumping dried up his wells, and that he was entitled to relief.53 The
defendant asserted that California followed the absolute ownership
doctrine of groundwater law whereby "each landowner owns absolutely
the percolating waters in his land, with the right to extract, sell, and
dispose of them as he chooses, regardless of the results to his
neighbor. ' 54 The plaintiff denied absolute ownership was the law in
California, but had a second theory. He claimed they were both
pumping from an underground stream, and as a result, the law
governing percolating groundwater, even if it was absolute ownership,
did not apply.55
What makes the case especially significant here is the court found
that it need not decide whether the water in question was a
subterranean stream or percolating groundwater, because absolute
ownership was not the law of percolating groundwater in California."
Thus, the defendant would lose whether the water in question was
percolating water or the water of a subterranean stream. Today Katz
is universally known as the case that declared correlative rights to be
the doctrine governing competing groundwater pumpers in
California. 5 What is not so well remembered is the decision broke
sharply with tradition and precedent, and rejected claims that absolute
ownership must be the law of percolating groundwater because that
was the common law rule, because California had adopted the
common law, and because Hanson v. McCue, a previous California
9
Supreme Court decision, had stated in dictum that it was the law.5 The
rejection of the common law absolute ownership rule in Katz was at the
time considered "novel, and of the utmost importance" and the case
51. 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Katz, 74 P. at 771.
57. See id. at 772.
58. Id. Amazingly, people still quote the absolute ownership language that
appeared in instruction 12 in Pomeroy. See, e.g., Letter from William H. Baber III, Esq.,
Partner, Minasian, Spruance, Baber, Meith, Soares & Sexton, LLP, to State Water
Resources Control Board 2 (April 18, 2000) (on file with the author). They quote the
language despite the supreme court's express disavowal of absolute ownership as the
law in Katz. Katz, 74 P. at 771.
59. Katz, 74 P. at 770-71; Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, 309 (Cal. 1871).
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was decided by the court upon rehearing, following exhaustive
briefing. 60
The relevance of the groundbreaking decision in Katz is that it
made the doctrinal gymnastics of the Pomeroy case unnecessary, and
reduced the subterranean stream category to virtual irrelevance. If
landowners pumping groundwater-even percolating groundwatermust respect the rights of other water-rights holders whom their
pumping injures, then it makes no difference in a case like Pomeroy
whether the water in question was a subterranean stream or
percolating water. Since Los Angeles had a paramount pueblo right to
the waters of the Los Angeles River, any diversion of groundwater that
impaired that right would violate Los Angeles' right under the rule of
Katz. 6
Katz essentially determined the resolution of conflict between
contending water users should be based on the impact of one use
upon another, rather than upon some ex-ante classification of the
source. This change was calculated to bring the legal rules into
congruence with hydrological realities; and in doing so, to replace the
legal fiction that groundwater movement was unknowable with casespecific factual inquiries. Was the water's movement known or
practically determinable? If so, what were the impacts? And if there
were impacts, were they legally redressable?
Had the Katz decision preceded Pomeroy, the subterranean stream
concept in California law might well have faded into the mists of legal
history. As the court stated in Katz, "averment[s] that... water
constitute[s] part of an underground stream may be regarded as
surplusage." 6' That statement is especially notable because the author
of the Katz opinion was none other than Lucien Shaw, the trial court
judge in Pomeroy.63 It was Judge Shaw's instructions that were the
subject of the decision in Pomeroy, and it was Shaw who relied on the
absolute ownership doctrine from Hanson v. McCue in his
instructions. 64 His reliance on the absolute ownership doctrine may
have been the very thing that led the Pomeroy court to rely on the
subterranean stream finding, and to equivocate about the status of all
the rest of the percolating, tributary groundwater in the San Fernando
Valley. Yet four years later it was the same Lucien Shaw, now ajustice
(and later chief justice) of the California Supreme Court, who wrote
the Katz opinion stating the "subterranean stream" category was
effectively "surplusage."'5 Indeed, in a law review article he wrote many
years later, Shaw restated the holding of Pomeroy in terms that brought

60. Katz, 74 P. at 766.
61. See City of Los Angeles v. Hunter, 105 P. 755, 757 (Cal. 1909).
62.

Katz, 74 P. at 766.

63. Id.
64. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 593-94 (Cal. 1899) (referring to

"absolute owners" in instruction 12).
65. Katz, 74 P. at 766-67.
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That case, he said,
it into line with Katz and subsequent decisions.
stood for the proposition that "persons having rights in a natural
stream were threatened with injury by the extraction of the
percolating
[!] water which sustained and supported the stream in its
6
floW.

Why, then, did Shaw give the instruction he did in Pomeroy, which
made the distinction between a subterranean stream and percolating
ground water so important? Shaw gave the explanation in his opinion
in Katz. Speaking of himself, he said:
Inasmuch as the writer of this opinion [in Katz] was also the writer of
the instruction under consideration [in Pomeroy], it may be proper to
say that he did not give the instruction because he approved that part
of it restating the doctrine of Hanson v. McCue. The instruction was
given because ... [it] had been requested by the appellants in the
case, and... [Los Angeles] consented that that part should be given
in substance, rather than take the chances of a reversal of the case
should the Supreme Court hold its refusal to be erroneous [that is,
should the supreme court approve the absolute ownership
doctrine].68
In short, Los Angeles was worried that absolute ownership might
be held to be the law of percolating groundwater in California, and if
it were, then Los Angeles could only prevail if the water under the land
being condemned was not percolating groundwater, but was part of a
subterranean stream. 69 Thus, to be on the safe side, it agreed to the
instruction, and the Pomeroy court, unwilling or unready to repudiate

the absolute ownership doctrine, assumed its validity, and was thus
obliged to draw the subterranean stream/percolating groundwater
distinction."0
It was not until Shaw's opinion in Katz that the court decisively
repudiated absolute ownership.71 Any doubt the subterranean stream
issue was no longer considered significant to groundwater litigation in
California was removed in subsequent supreme court decisions. In a
case decided less than a month after Katz, Justice Shaw wrote:
The case of Katz v. Walkinshaw ...establishes a rule with respect to
waters percolating in the soil, which makes it to a large extent
immaterial whether the waters in this land were or were not a part of
an underground stream, provided the fact be established that their
extraction from the ground diminished to that extent, or to some
substantial extent, the waters flowing in the stream.72

66. Lucien Shaw, The Development of the Law of Waters in the West, 10 CAL. L. REv. 443,
458 (1922).

67. Id. (exclamation point added).
68. Katz, 74 P. at 770.

69. See id.
70. See id.

71. Id. at 771.
72. McClintock v. Hudson, 74 P. 849, 850-51 (Cal. 1903). The court made this
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Then in 1909, in another groundwater case, the court stated
"[t]here is no rational ground for any distinction between such
percolating waters and the waters in the gravels immediately beneath
and directly supporting the surface flow, and no reason for applying a
different rule to the two classes ...if, indeed, the two classes can be
distinguished at all."7
74
That same year the court decided City of Los Angeles v. Hunter.
Hunter dealt with the question raised but left in limbo in Pomeroy: What
right did landowners in the San Fernando Valley further from the
stream than those in Pomeroy (though still within the several-miles-wide
banks area identified in Pomeroy) have to pump tributary groundwater
that diminished flows in the Los Angeles River?" In order to quiet title
to its paramount right to use of the waters of the river, Los Angeles
brought suit against owners of some 5,000 acres in the San Fernando
Valley, of which the owners were pumping water asserted to be
tributary to the Los Angeles River."' The defendants' principal claim
was "that the waters are strictly percolating waters, not belonging to
the subterranean flow of the stream, but if concededly on the way to
join and swell such flow, still percolating waters, to the use of which, as
owners of the land, they have an absolute indefeasible right.""
The court rejected this claim, holding it was immaterial whether
the waters in question were considered percolating or not."' Since
"[t]hese waters percolate.., in the sense that they form a vast mass of
water confined in a basin filled with detritus, always slowly moving
downward to the outlet [which is the Los Angeles River, then insofar
as] Los Angeles has paramount right to the use of all the waters of the
river.., none of these so-called percolating waters may be withdrawn
to the invasion and injury of such right." 79 It was held unnecessary, as
in Katz and McClintock, to classify the water either as percolating or as a
subterranean stream.80
When Kinney, on whose 1894 treatise the Pomeroy court had
relied,' published his second edition in 1912 he acknowledged the
statement in response to a claim by a surface riparian user that a neighboring
landowner was unlawfully interfering with the plaintiff's right by pumping and taking
water offsite for use, because the groundwater being pumped was a "subterranean
stream" drawing from the surface stream. Id. at 849.
73. Hudson v. Dailey, 105 P. 748, 753 (Cal. 1909). The category had not wholly
disappeared, it seems. See Arroyo Ditch & Water Co. v. Baldwin, 100 P. 874, 875 (Cal.

1909). The Arroyo Ditch decision's use of the subterranean stream category is at odds

with the great weight of California Supreme Court opinions of that era.
74. 105 P. 755 (Cal. 1909). Notably the decision in the Hunter case was written by

Justice Frederick W. Henshaw, who participated in both Pomeroy and Katz City of Los
Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 605 (Cal. 1899); Katz, 74 P. at 773.
75. Hunter, 105 P. at 756.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78.

Id. at 757.

79. Id.
80.

Hunter, 105 P. at 757.

81. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 598 (Cal. 1899) (quoting KINNEY I,
supra note 30, § 48, at 69-70).
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change. Citing the more recent California cases, such as Hunter, he
explained that only a limited class of percolating waters, diffused
percolating waters, "are considered as a part of the very soil itself and
belong to the realty in which they are found."82 Picking up the test of
Hunter,he explained that "these [percolating] waters are those which,
as far as known, do not contribute or are not tributary to the flow of any
definite stream or body of surface or subterranean waters. " " Though
unwilling to let loose of the old terminology, Kinney acknowledged the
groundwater question was becoming a matter of evidence based on the
ability to determine hydrological relationships, rather than a formal
classification based on the geography of the water's movement:
It is plain to see that, as the years go by, the class of diffused
percolating waters will be growing smaller and smaller. This is due to
the scientific investigations of the movements of percolating waters
through the ground, and also to the discoveries which are constantly
being made that certain waters which were once considered mere
percolations flowed in defined subterranean channels which have
become known ....In time, if the courts are as active in establishing
new rules governing subterranean waters within the next few years as
they have been in the past ten years, which rules have but kept pace
with the scientific investigations upon the subject, this class of
subterranean waters will pass from the class of those flowing in
unknown courses to those flowing in known courses, and the 'secret
incomprehensible influences,' and 'practical uncertainties'
will
84
become comprehensible influences and practical certainties.

The newer Californiajudicial approach that Kinney acknowledged,
which focused on whether groundwater was known to be contributing
to a surface stream, as the line of demarcation, continued into modern
times. In 1943, in Los Angeles v. Glendale, the supreme court stated
unequivocally that Los Angeles' pueblo right in the Los Angeles River
extended to all the groundwater in the San Fernando Valley upon
which the flow of the river depended. 5 The court also made clear, by
citing Hunter as authority, it did not view that case as limited to
groundwater in the southeast corner of the valley within the bed and
banks area described by Pomeroy:
It has long been established that as successor to the pueblo of Los
Angeles, the city of Los Angeles has a right, superior to that of a
riparian or an appropriator, to satisfy its needs from the waters of the
Los Angeles River. Because the flow of the river is dependent on the supply
of water in the San FernandoValley, it has also been 86held that the pueblo right
includes a priorright to all of the waters in the basin.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

2 KINNEY II, supra note 30, § 1188.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (citations omitted).
142 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Cal. 1943).
Id. at 292 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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In 1975, in Los Angeles v. San Fernando, the supreme court
reaffirmed Glendale explicitly. 7 But it did something else as well. It
made clear that the scope of Los Angeles' pueblo right grew out of the
scope of the waters of the Los Angeles River, and that the scope of the
Los Angeles River was determined by the extent of the groundwater
that was tributary to the river.88 In other words, for determining
pueblo rights, the Los Angeles River consists of its surface flow and the
groundwater tributary to it. The court decided the subterranean
extent of the Los Angeles River is measured by the tributary nature of
the groundwater in the San Fernando Valley, the very thing that
Pomeroy said it was not deciding.89 Revealingly, both the Glendale and
San Fernando cases cite Hunter, not Pomeroy, as authority for the
expansive view of the subterranean extent of the Los Angeles River. 90
In this respect, it is important to note Glendale and San Fernandodo not
simply say pueblo rights extend to groundwater beneath the pueblo
boundaries." The court conceived of the pueblo right as including,
within the surface stream, its tributary groundwater-the "waters of the
Los Angeles River and the waters supplying it.29

The cases are about

"rights in the Los Angeles River,"93 "the river to which the pueblo right
attaches."" That, of course, is a fundamentally different view both
from the 1894 Kinney classification of waters, 95 and from the boundary
the court in Pomeroy was at pains to identify when it said its decision was
not meant to embrace the entire San Fernando Valley. 96
But - and this is a most important "but" - the legislation upon

which section 1200 of the Water Code rests did not follow the path
that Justice Shaw and the California Supreme Court's subsequent
pueblo rights cases set out. Instead, by a circuitous path, the
legislature was led back to the distinction and formulation the Pomeroy
court had used. How that happened is the subject of the pages that
follow.
III. THE STATUTORY RESPONSE
A. THE WATER COMMISSION ACT OF 1913
Prior to 1911, all appropriation rights to surface water were
acquired under sections 1410 to 1422 of the Civil Code, which

87. 537 P.2d 1250, 1287-88 (Cal. 1975).
88. Id. at 1288.

89. Id.; City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 598 (Cal. 1899).
90.
91.
297.
92.

See City of San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1261, 1286; City of Glendale, 142 P.2d at 292.
See City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1288; City of Glendale, 142 P.2d at 292-93,
City of San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1261 (quoting City of Glendale, 142 P.2d at 293).

93. Id. at 1281 n.23.
94. Id. at 1288.
95.
96.

KINNEY I, supranote 30, at 69-70.

City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 597 (Cal. 1899).
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essentially required filing a notice of appropriation." Failure to
comply made appropriators vulnerable to subsequent claimants who
complied with the statutes.98 The state did not administrate water
rights.99 Groundwater was simply pumped by overlying landowners
In 1911, the
without any state administration or regulation. 09
to study the
Commission
legislature established a State Conservation
of the
resources
need for new laws to control the use of the natural
State (one of which was water), report to the governor, and
recommend measures to the legislature. 10' George C. Pardee, a
progressive Republican, who had been California's Governor from
1903-07, was appointed chairman of the Commission. The other two
members were Francis Cuttle and J.P. Baumgartner. The report of the
Commission was transmitted on January 1, 1913,102 and its legislative
proposal for water was the source for the bill that ultimately became
the Water Commission Act. 03 Section 42 of that Act is, with very slight
The
changes, today's California Water Code Section 1200.1' 4
inspiration for the enactment of a comprehensive water law was
influential 1901 Report of Irrigation Investigations in
Elwood Mead's
05
California.

The original legislative draft prepared by the Conservation
Commission explicitly provided a permit system both for surface and
underground waters, and the two categories were dealt with in
separate, similar sections of the draft bill.'0 Just as the bill recognized
riparian uses of surface water, and did not subject them to permitting,
CAL. CIV. CODE§§ 1410-1422 (1908) (repealed in part 1943).
Id. § 1419.
See id. §§ 1410-1422.
See STATE CONSERVATION COMM'N, 1913 REPORT OF THE CONSERVATION
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 31 (1913) [hereinafter COMM'N FIRST REPORT]
(transmitted to the Governor and LegislatureJan. 1, 1913).
101. Act of Apr. 8, 1911, ch. 408, §§ 1 & 3, 1911 Cal. Stat. 822. At the same time the
legislature established a State Board of Control (the next year its work was taken over
by the State Water Commission), which had authority to accept applications for the
use of water for power purposes, and which could grant term licenses for twenty-five
years (later extended to forty years). Act of Jan. 2, 1912, ch. 41, § 1, 1912 Cal. Stat.
177; Act of April 8, ch. 406, § 1, 1911 Cal. Stat. 813. See STATE CONSERVATION COMM'N,
97.
98.
99.
100.

1914 REPORT OF THE CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 7 (1914).
102. COMM'N FIRST REPORT, supra note 100, at 19-42. No official version of the

Commission's legislative recommendation is extant. A version found in the Charles
David Marx Papers, at Stanford University, SC 161, Series VIII, Box 1, is undoubtedly
the Commission's bill, as explained more fully below. See discussion infra text
accompanying note 117.
103. Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 45, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1033.
104. Id.; CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West Supp. 2003).
105. ELWOOD MEAD, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF IRRIGATION INVESTIGATIONS IN
CALIFORNIA BULLETIN NO. 100 (1901). Elwood Mead, a pioneer in western water law,

was the first state engineer of Wyoming, and later Commissioner of the Federal
Bureau of Reclamation. See COMM'N FIRST REPORT, supra note 100, at 35.
106. SeeWater Commission Bill, §§ 2, 9-13, 27 (proposed to the General Assembly by
the California Conservation Commission in 1913) [hereinafter Water Commission
Bill]. There was some odd lack of parallelism. While the bill required registration of
proposed riparian uses and abolished unused surface riparian rights after four years of
nonuse, no such limitations were imposed on overlying uses of groundwater. See id.
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it recognized the right of overlying landowners to use underground
water on overlying land without permitting. 1 7 But it did require those
seeking either surface stream appropriations, or groundwater
appropriations for use off the overlying land, to obtain appropriation
permits.0 8 In addition, the bill specifically granted the Commission
authority to protect those with surface stream rights against off-tract
underground pumpers "where it is claimed that such development and
carrying away of water is diminishing the supply of water of such
riparian owner or appropriator of water from the streams of water or
underground water of the State of California."'0 9
In short, the Commission bill sought to eliminate substantively
different groundwater and surface water legal regimes, and to institute
integrated, parallel systems. But because the bill still recognized
underground water and surface water as distinct categories, the
Commission had not really rid itself of the need to answer the
question: what is groundwater, and what is surface water?" ° Section 8
of the bill defined "[u]nderground water, for the purpose of this
act.. . as any water that occurs or is found beneath the surface of the
ground," and generated a lengthy discussion in hearings held by the
Commission.
The predictable question was: if a surface stream
moves underground for a certain distance, and then again rises to the
surface, may one put a pump in the below-surface area and then be
subject to the underground water provisions of the act, rather than the
surface water provisions?"' The Commission debated the question
whether there was water that "occurs or is found beneath the surface
of the ground" that should not be treated as underground water, but as
surface water?"
107. Id. §§ 2, 8-12.
108. Id. §§ 13, 27.
109. Id. § 17.
110. Samuel Wiel, a prominent San Francisco attorney and writer on water law, was
in active consultation with the Commission, and had suggested, unsuccessfully, a
"consolidated" system. Wiel says that his "suggestions were not acted upon by the
Commission and form no part of the bill presented to the legislature, nor of the
statute passed." Samuel C. Wiel, A Short Code of Underground Waters, 2 CAL. L. REv. 25,
25 (1914). Wiel's notion was that "[a] definite body of water upon the surface, and
the underground water proximately connected therewith in natural occurrence,
constitute a consolidated underground and surface water-supply" and that rights
should "extend to the whole and every part of a consolidated surface and
underground water-supply.., without distinction between the surface part and the
underground part." Id. at 26.
111. Water Commission Bill, supra note 106, § 8.
112. It is not clear what exactly the differences in result would have been, since, in
general, the bill sought to integrate the two sources, but it seemed to have anticipated
at least one difference: Under section 17 of the bill, groundwater appropriators
making off-tract uses were made subordinate to surface-stream riparians whose supply
their appropriations diminish. Id. § 17. However, there was nothing in the bill that
made surface-stream appropriators subordinate to overlying on-tract users of
groundwater when the surface-stream appropriations diminish their supply, though
groundwater appropriators appear to be thus subordinated under section 15(a). Id.
§ 15(a).
113. Id.§8.
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The following excerpts from a hearing held on the Commission's
original bill on May 28, 1912, are exceptionally revealing of how those
involved in the development of the 1913 legislation were thinking
about the issue at the time. The chair of the Commission, former
Governor George Pardee, was going through the Commission's draft
bill section by section:
MR. PARDEE: Section 8: Underground water, for the purpose of
this Act, is defined as any water that occurs or is found beneath the
surface of the ground

MR. KEECH: ... The sub-surface stream is deemed to be part of
the stream; one minute it is in the open and another minute it is
below the surface. The vested rights in a stream under the riparian
law is [sic] the stream consisting of the running open water on the
surface and also of the sub-surface water in the same bed.

MR. BAUMGARTNER: As we have handled "Stream flow" in the
Bill, does it interfere with the sub-surface stream?
MR. KEECH: You have handled "stream" so far under the term of
riparian rights only, and the riparian rights include that sub-surface
flow and is [sic] sustained by the courts, and sustained by
constitutional provision. Now you propose to take out and destroy it
as a stream flow and put in and classify underground water with subsurface flow.
MR. PARDEE: How would this do: [Underground water ...

is

defined as any water that occurs or is found beneath the surface of
the ground] "[o] utside limits of defined stream."

MR. CUTTLE: All I seek is to determine what is underground
stream and what is percolating water.
MR. KEECH: ... This sub-surface flow is an all important matter
and it is so radical a departure from the law that I do not think it
would stand. I think you have attempted to incorporate riparian law
in accordance with the decisions of the courts, but now you take that
underground flow right out of the rule and class it with water with
which it has never been classed; and since you provide for both kinds
of water, why have you made that radical change?
MR. PARDEE: Put right at the end of the sentence "Exterior to
banks of streams". ["Underground water, for the purpose of this Act,
is defined as any water that occurs or is found beneath the surface of
the ground exterior to banks of streams."]
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MR. KEECH: I should say [except] "Sub-stream flow." You have
not defined stream flow, but nevertheless it is defined under the law.
You have not defined stream, but that is a term known to the law.
Either would be satisfactory to me.
MR. PARDEE: You want it confined to the banks of a stream?
MR. KEECH: Yes, that is all right....
[It was then suggested that confining sub-stream flow to the banks of
the stream was too narrow a definition, narrower than the court had
already determined in Pomeroy].

MR. KEECH: What would you say?
MR. SHORT: I would say stream flow and nothing more.

MR. TAIT: I would say just [water that occurs or is found beneath
the surface of the ground] "[o] ther than stream flow".
MR. CUTTLE: Would not this difficulty crop up of determining
what is underground stream flow or percolating water?
MR. SHORT: You cannot get rid of this difficulty. The rights of
one kind of water is [sic] of one nature, and of the other kind of
water of another nature. You want to leave the stream unimpaired
and call all other kind of water underground water.

MR. WIEL: I suggest this Bill have two or three chapters,
underground water and stream flow,- and provide that no water that
directly effects [sic]
a surface flow sall be affected by this
[underground] chapter....

MR. SHORT: My suggestion would be that the Act, the general
scope, should apply to all waters now unappropriated as stream flow,
andto all underground waters other than stream flow. When you say
that you have done the best you can.

114. Hearing on Proposed Water Commission Bill Before the California State Water

Commission, 8-13 (May 28, 1912) [hereinafter Hearing]. Stenographic transcripts of
these hearings were found in Oakland in the Pardee Home Museum Papers, Water
Conservation, Box 29 (copies of the transcripts are on file with the author). The cast
of characters in the hearings is as follows: Pardee was the chair of the Conservation
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It is clear from this colloquy that the men who drafted the
Conservation Commission's bill understood that any line separating
groundwater from surface water was a human construct made for some
managerial purpose, rather than a line separating two distinct
hydrological entities.
Notably, no one made reference to the
formalism of Kinney, or to traditional conceptions of "subterranean
streams." They seem to have understood perfectly well that water was a
continuum. They conceived their task as drawing a functionally useful,
if hydraulically arbitrary, line at what was effectively part of the stream
flow. Their purpose was to define what uses would come within the
bill's provisions dealing with "underground water," such as section 13,
and "appropriators of waters from the streams," such as section 17. As
Samuel Wiel-the leading water law authority of his day, and a
participant in the above-quoted colloquy-put it, what was needed for
that purpose was a definition sufficient to protect streams against
pumping that "directly effects [sic] a surface flow."" 5
Both the Commission's original bill and the above discussion
demonstrate that these water experts, as of 1913, did not believe
groundwater was too mysterious in its ways to be subject to legal
control. The commonly heard notion that people back then still16
considered groundwater incapable of management is simply wrong.
As we shall see shortly, the legislative reluctance to institute integrated
management was fundamentally based on legal reservations, not
technical or managerial ones.
Commission, and, as noted above, Francis Cuttle and J.P. Baumgartner were the other
two Commission Members. E.E. Keech was a lawyer practicing in Santa Ana, who
represented water users in San Bernardino, Riverside, and Los Angeles Counties.
Samuel Wiel, as noted above, was a very prominent San Francisco lawyer and a prolific
writer on water law. Frank H. Short of Fresno was a prominent water lawyer who
represented Central Valley agricultural interests. Mr. Tait was probably C.E. Tait, who
was senior irrigation engineer, in the office of public roads and rural engineering, at
the United States Department of Agriculture. He was a member of a commission that

issued a report on the utilization of the Mojave River for irrigation in Victor Valley in
1917. 1 have not been able to identify Mr. Lane. He might have been Franklin K.
Lane, who was Secretary of the Interior in President Wilson's Cabinet, and previously a
water lawyer in San Francisco. However, Lane was a member of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, and in Washington, D.C. from 1905-1913, when he became
Interior Secretary.
115. Id. at 12. As described in supra note 110, Wiel personally opposed drawing any
distinction between ground and surface water, though that was never the position of
the Commission. In this same colloquy Wiel said:

I would not make any distinction between stream flow and underground
water, make no distinction whatever, but take water supply. If water supply is
partially underground and partially on the surface, there is no reason why
people should not enjoy it whether underground [or] in the stream. There
should be a right in the supply regardless of whether underground or

surface.
Id. at 12-13. Mr. Keech replied that such a proposal "is a departure from this Bill and

is a radical construction." Id. at 13.
116. The usual source for this belief is an 1850 Connecticut case, in which the court

said groundwater influences "are so secret, changeable and uncontroulable [sic], we
cannot subject them to the regulations of law, nor build upon them a system of rules,
as has been done with streams upon the surface." Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 532, 540

(1850).
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By the time the Commission's bill was introduced in the Assembly
some seven months later, it had been extensively revised." 7 Though
we have the bills themselves, and the votes on various amendments,
the full history of the legislation's development during the legislative
session is lost (or at least has not yet been found), though we do have
numerous newspaper reports on the bill's progress through the
legislature. Most importantly, we have the bill originally drafted by the
Commission, and a full transcript of the hearings (from which the
above excerpts were taken) in which many-probably most-of the
most influential figures participated."' It appears there was another
somewhat modified version that appeared between the time of the
Commission draft and the first introduced bill, and there is a law
review commentary discussing it in some detail," 9 but the draft itself
has not been found. From the commentary, it appears to have been
very similar to the bill introduced in the Assembly.20 As can best be
gleaned from the law review text, that draft contained nothing new or
significant relating to groundwater.
No explicit evidence of authorship has been found as to any of the
bill drafts or amendments, but an undated document supporting the
law, written just prior to the time it was submitted to a public
referendum in 1914, has been found among Governor Pardee's
papers. That document says "This Water Commission Law was drawn
by the State Conservation Commission, aided by a number of
prominent attorneys, among whom may be mentioned Judge Curtis H.
Lindley, of San Francisco; Judge Farraher, of Siskiyou; E.E. Keech, of
Santa Ana..''. In Pardee's hand there is22 an insert at this point saying
"Mention any others you may think of."

Assemblyman W.A. Johnstone introduced Assembly Bill No. 642 on
January 23, 1913.123 The bill seems to follow Wiel's advice given in the
hearings (though not his more general groundwater proposals in his
117.

Compare Water Commission Bill, supra note 106, with A.B. 642, 40th Leg., Reg.

Sess. (Cal. 1913).
118. The existence of these materials was unknown until they were discovered in the
course of preparing the report from which this article is drawn.

The original

legislative drafts were discovered in the archives of the Pardee Home Museum in
Oakland, California, and the transcript of the hearings on them in the Charles David
Marx Papers in the Stanford University Library. Copies of the legislative drafts and

transcripts of the hearings are on file with the author.
119. See generally A.E. Chandler, The "Water Bill" Proposed by the Conservation
Commission of California,1 CAL. L. REV. 148, 161-68 (1913).
120. Compare id., with A.B. 642.

121. Undated unsigned typescript author identified among Governor Pardee's
papers (on file with the author).
122. Id. Franklin Hichborn, while covering the legislature for the Sacramento Bee,

stated "Francis Cuttle ... had much to do with the framing of the measure." FRANKLIN
HIC-IBORN, STORY OF THE SESSION OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE OF 1913, at 153
(1913).
123. A.B. 642. Johnstone became Chair of the State Water Commission in 1915,
succeeding Professor Charles David Marx of Stanford University. Johnstone and
Pardee knew each other, and some correspondence between them (though not on
this subject) is among the Pardee papers.
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1914 law review article). 24 The bill makes no distinction between
surface water and groundwater, but simply covers "water" generally. 2 '
It establishes a permit system for the appropriation of all water which
has never been appropriated or applied to riparian use, 26 recognizes
existing appropriations, and abolishes unused riparian rights after five
years from the time the bill is enacted.2 7 This is not different in
substance from what the original Commission bill sought to do, as it
would have created an appropriation permit system for both
groundwater and surface water. Unlike the original Commission draft,
it did not take up groundwater and surface water in separate
provisions. By creating a unified system of appropriation applicable to
all water, the bill as introduced avoided the need to define or
distinguish surface water from underground water, the issue that had
so troubled the Commission members and their advisors during the
hearing quoted above.'28 Section 42 of the introduced bill simply says
"[t]he word 'water' in this act shall be construed as embracing the
of water' in this act shall be
term 'or use of water'; and the term 'or use
12 9
construed as embracing the word 'water.'
That approach did not last for long. The very first amendment to
the bill, dated April 2, added the following sentence to section 42
stating "[w]henever the terms stream, stream system, lake or other
body of water occurs in this act [and those were the operative terms for
water in the bill], such term shall be interpreted to refer only to
surface water." 3 0 Surprisingly, this significant change from both the
Commission draft and the bill as introduced, sweeping away
governance of groundwater, appears to have generated no
controversy, and to have been acceptable to the supporters of the
bill. 3' The most likely reason is that they had been persuaded that
subjecting groundwater to the same permitting system as surface water
exceeded the state's authority, and thereby hangs a most significant
tale .
While I have found nothing documenting the thinking of those

124. SeeWiel, supra note 110, at 25.
125. The bill never mentions groundwater, underground water, or subsurface water
in any form. It is simply implicitly incorporated in the overall definition of water.

126. A.B. 642 §§ 1, 15-16. In what is probably an unintended omission, it does not
explicitly recognize overlying on-tract uses of groundwater, the analogue of riparian
rights on a stream.
127. Id. §§ 11, 34.
128. See Hearing,supra note 114, at 8-13.

129. A.B. 642 § 42.
130. April 2 Amendment to A.B. 642, 40th Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1913), reprinted in 1913
AsSEM.J. 1116, 1128, § 42 (Cal. Apr. 2,1913).

131. See HicHBoRN, supra note 122, at 150 (noting that amendments proposed by the
Conservation Committee were adopted "without difficulty").
132. One bit of evidence in support of the view that the concern was about the
scope of state authority is that when this amendment was adopted, the title of the bill

was also changed. A sentence was added to the beginning of the title saying "to
regulate the use of water which is subject to such control by the State of California,
and in that behalf." Apr. 2 Amendment to A.B. 642 at amend. 1, 1116.
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who drafted the amendment, there is some highly revealing material
in the Commission's hearings during the previous year, and doubtless
those who participated in the Commission's hearings also participated
in the development of the bill as it moved through the legislature. On
the same day the colloquy excerpted above took place, there was also a
discussion of the scope of legislative permitting authority over
groundwater. The Commission's discussion had moved on from
section 8 to section 11 of the bill."' The section dealing with
groundwater provided "[o]wners of overlying land shall have the right
to use such underground water on such overlying land only, and such
use shall be for useful and beneficial purposes only, and may be had
'4
without appropriating the same or filing notice of appropriation.' 1
Section 13 said that " [t] he right to appropriate underground water for
use on other than overlying land may be acquired by filing application
for appropriation of such underground water with the said Water
Commission... and complying with all conditions required from
appropriation of water from streams of water.. . .""' And section 27 of
the bill gave the Water Commission broad discretion to impose
conditions through adoption of rules and regulations that limited the
extent and purposes for which appropriations could be made. 3 "
These provisions generated a lively discussion about the nature of a
landowner's existing property right to use groundwater. All agreed
that beneficial overlying uses should be recognized, and that any uses
37
had to respect the rights of others, as Katz v. Walkinshaw had held.
The question was whether the legislature had the authority to subject
non-overlying uses to a discretionary permit system parallel to the one
that applied to surface streams. The claim effectively was that there
was an important legal difference between the status of surface
streams, whose unappropriated water belonged to the public, and
underground water in which-though subject to correlative rightsthe overlying owner held a property interest. If there was a preexisting property right (even though it was not the absolute ownership
of the common law, and was correlative with other rights as per Katz),
then arguably the effort to give a Commission fully discretionary
permitting authority-to deny a permit for some reason other than to
protect another's water rights-was at odds with the landowner's
property interest in groundwater beneath his land.'
Wiel started the discussion, saying "[i]f you give somebody the
right to appropriate water you assume the right to take it away from

133. See Hearing, supra note 114, at 17. During the hearing Governor Pardee
suggested the following change: "Owners of overlying land shall have the right to use
such underground water on such overlying land only, and such use shall be for useful
and beneficial purposes only .... provided such use is for domestic purposes only." Id.
134. Water Commission Bill, supranote 106, § 11.
135. Id. § 13.
136. Id. § 27.
137. 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903).
138. See generally Hearing,supra note 114, at 17-29.
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them."'39 Frank Short added "[h]ere [in the bill] it says they cannot
take water from land and put it upon other land. Now [under existing
law], they have the unrestricted riht to take water from any land and
Then, following some further
put it upon any other land....
discussion of this point, Short made the following statement:
MR. SHORT: A man has as much right to extract water as coal[,]
oil or any other part of the substance of this land, and the only
limitation in the doing of that is he must not take it in such a way as
to injure his neighbor. That is the settled right in property. Over the

water percolating the ground he has the power the same as over
other property; it is no more a jurisdiction over the underlying,

percolating water than it is over any other substance in the
ground....

MR. LANE: ...The only question is, would it be unconstitutional
as restricting the use of property, if it required the owner of lot A to
get a permit before he could transport it to lot C. That goes to the
constitutionality and not to the question of policy.

MR. PARDEE: Who owns the water underground?
MR. SHORT: The land owner.
MR. PARDEE: The ownership of the corpus of the water?
MR. SHORT: Sure, yes sir. When you say that something which is
now permitted by law cannot be done, and do say that something

different can be done in a different way, it seems to me the
Legislature would have no authority to do that.

If the law gives the right, as the law now is, we would not object to
restriction possibly, but to say it is unlawful without appropriation to
take water from overlying land to some other land, it would prohibit
the use of underground water....

What we object to is that we cannot use water where we now have
the right to its use, and this law would do away with a right that now
exists.
MR. CUTTLE: Write a section for that.
MR. SHORT: All right, I will do that. 4'
139. Id. at 18.
140. Id. at 19.
141. Id.at 21-22, 26-29. While no documentation of Short as a draftsman has been
found, Short did write a letter to the Commission several months after the hearings, in
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This discussion suggests that Short, who was an influential
representative of Central Valley agricultural interests, had raised
doubts in the minds of the legislation's supporters about the
constitutionality of imposing a discretionary permit system on the use
of groundwater on non-overlying land. "2 Of course, the Commission
had never intended to require a permit for use on overlying land,
43
which was considered a parallel to riparian uses of surface water.
Therefore, it was not surprising that an amendment to limit the
coverage of the bill to surface waters was proposed during the
legislative debate. 4 There seems to have been no controversy over
this amendment, suggesting that Short's legal argument was
persuasive. ""
It should be emphasized Short's claim was a limited one. He did
not assert there was no regulatory authority over non-overlying uses of
groundwater, or that such uses could not be integrated with surface
water rights. He was simply objecting to giving a permitting agency
discretionary authority to deny such uses altogether, except where it
was necessary to protect some other right in that water, such as a
correlative right by another groundwater user. 4 G Short was thus
which he again indicated his concern about the underground water provisions:
What I especially wish to impress, however, is that there appears to be no
sufficient or controlling reason for attempting to change the laws with
respect to subterranean or underground waters at all, as at present decided,
it is perfectly well understood, clearly definite and sufficient for all
purposes ... and I wholly fail to see that anything further is desirable. I have
given this subject considerable thought and study since the proceedings
before the Commission, and I am more than ever convinced that the
proposed legislation as to underground waters, except in so far as it relates
merely to the exercise of public authority thereover, should be entirely
eliminated as wholly unnecessary and hurtful.
Letter from Frank Short, Lawyer, to State Water Commission, at 4-5 (July 18, 1912)
(on file with the author). Mr. Short had elsewhere distinguished authority to regulate
to protect others' rights, for example, versus discretionary permitting to determine
whether water could be taken at all.
142. Short's view drew on language that percolating water belongs to the owner of
the soil, common in cases decided when absolute ownership was still thought to be the
rule in California. See Gould v. Eaton, 44 P. 319, 320 (Cal. 1896). It appears to have
been taken as authoritative, despite the decision in Katz, and even though in 1911 (two
years previously) California amended section 1410 of the Civil Code to read "[a]ll
water or the use of water within the State of California is the property of the people of
the State of California ....
Act of April 8, 1911, ch. 407, § 1, 1911 Cal. Stat. 821. See
CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
143. They certainly knew the recent decision in Hudson in which that very issue
arose. Hudson v. Dailey, 105 P. 748, 753 (Cal. 1909).
144. April 2 Amendment to A.B. 642, 40th Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1913), reprinted in 1913
AsSEM. J. 1116, 1128, § 42 (Cal. Apr. 2, 1913). The amendment read: "Whenever the
terms stream, stream system, lake or other body of water occurs in this Act, such term
shall be interpreted to refer only to surface water." Id.
145. HICHBORN, supra note 122, at 150. See also 1913 ASSEM. J. 1116, 2336 (Cal. Apr.
30, 1913) (statement of Assemblyman Brown regarding the April 30th Amendment to
A.B. 642).
146. While section 15 of the water bill, as introduced, gave the commission
discretion, the enacted version omitted discretion even over surface water
appropriations. Compare "The... commission may in its discretion allow ... the
appropriation of unappropriated water.... "A.B. 642, 40th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 15 (Cal.
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apparently making a claim that the plenary power and proprietary
interest in surface waters did not extend to groundwater; and that
property rights in groundwater were, though not absolute, nonetheless
an extant incident of landownership. Though such a claim would
hardly be likely to prevent a grant of discretionary permitting authority
under contemporary understanding of state legislative authority, 147 it
apparently was persuasive to legislators back in 1913.14' This seems to
explain why California decided to grant permitting jurisdiction over
surface water, but not groundwater.
In any event, the legislative decision created the need to
distinguish groundwater from surface water, again raising the problem
that had come up during the discussion of the Commission's original
draft. What, if any, water beneath the surface of the earth should be
included in the term "surface water," and subject to permitting
jurisdiction? Certainly, no one wanted a user to be able to circumvent
the law simply by diverting from a reach of a surface stream where the
water sank below the surface before emerging again, or by sinking a
well in a riverbank. The General Assembly addressed this issue on
April 30, when the following italicized language was added to section
1913), with "The ... commission shall allow.., the appropriation of unappropriated
water." Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 42, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1033.
147. Since a version of the language that appears today as Water Code § 102 had
been enacted in 1911, Short may have been pressing the point a bit far even back
then. Compare Act of Apr. 8., 1911, ch. 407, § 1, 1911 Cal. Stat. 821, with CAL. WATER
CODE § 102 (West 1971).
148. An extensive reading of contemporary newspaper accounts in the Fresno
Republican, Oakland Enquirer,Sacramento Bee, San FranciscoDaily News, and San Francisco
Call has turned up no indication of any controversy over changes in the bill regarding
groundwater coverage. For example, the Oakland Enquirer stated in one of its
articles:
[t]here was a preliminary hearing given to the elaborate measure in the
Assembly a few days ago, but there was a continuance of the subject granted
for the purpose of making changes which were considered advisable. The
committee worked Saturday as also last night on the subject, with the result
that it was the opinion of some of the assemblymen who had opposed certain
features when the bill was before the Assembly [that] the measure had been
strengthened in a satisfactory manner and that a number of the features
which had not appealed favorably to some of the members of the lower
house had been so rewritten as to satisfy the most insistent of the critics. The
amendments were ordered printed and the measure, as amended, will come
up for passage in a few days.
Conservation Bill Amended and Strengthened: Brown Amendment to Johnstone Measure
Discussed,OAKLAND ENQUIRER, Apr. 21, 1913, at 6. Similarly, another article states "the
amendments proposed yesterday ... were of a minor character, none of them
touching any of the main features of the proposed enactment." Edward A. O'Brien,
Considering New Conservation Features: Assembly Talks up the Amendments to Measure,
OAKLAND ENQUIRER, Apr. 22, 1913, at 3. Of course the bill was still too strong for its
opponents. See generally Water Bill Held Back by Argument, OAKLAND ENQUIRER, Apr. 29,
1913, at 1; ProposedSupervision of all State Water Rights by Commission, Editorial, OAKLAND

ENQUIRER, Apr. 29, 1913, at 19.
149. The legal concern expressed was limited to discretionary permitting authority,
see supra text following note 140. The legislative result, however, was to deny any
permitting jurisdiction at all over (percolating) groundwater. See Water Commission
Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 11, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1018, and that is still the law; see CAL.
WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971).
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42: "Whenever the terms stream, stream system, lake or other body of
water or water occurs in this act, such term shall be interpreted to
refer only to surface water, 50 and to subterranean streams flowing through
known and definite channels."

This, of course, is the language from the Pomeroy decision."' It was
enacted into the Water Commission Act of 1913,5 and it remains
today, with only insubstantial change, as section 1200 of the Water
Code." Strikingly, this "subterranean stream" language appeared for
the first time at a late stage in the evolution of the law. It never came
up in the Commission's report,14 in its original bill, 1 5 in any of three

Commission hearing sessions on the bill,'5 6 or in the bill as first
introduced in the Assembly,' 7 even though, as we have seen, efforts to
distinguish surface water and underground water had engaged the
bill's drafters at some length in the May 28th hearings the previous
year. 15 None of the suggested phrasing put forward in that hearing,
such as "sub-stream flow," 59"sub-surface water in the same bed" or
"underground stream flow"' appeared in the final bill as enacted.' 0
Why did the bill's draftsmen use the Pomeroy language, which drew
on the formalistic approach of the Kinney treatise, rather than one of
the phrasings that had been suggested in the previous year's hearings?
No documentation has been found to answer this question, or to
explain the reasoning for any of the other amendments made to
section 42 of the bill. l ' The likeliest explanation is that, rather than
150. April 30 Amendment to A.B. 642, 40th Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1913), reprinted in 1913
ASSEM. J. 2336 (Cal. Apr. 30, 1913) (emphasis added). Though the language was
offered by Assemblyman Henry Ward Brown of San Mateo, an opponent of the bill, it
appears to have generated no objection, either by proponents or opponents. Brown
was a lawyer and a graduate of Hastings College of the Law.
151. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 598 (Cal. 1899).
152. SeeWater Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 11, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1018.
153. CAL. WATER CODE§ 1200 (West 1971).
154. See generallyCOMM'N FIRST REPORT, supranote 100 (lacking this language).
155. See generally Water Commission Bill, supra note 106.
156. See generally Hearing,supra note 114 (lacking this language).
157. See generally A.B. 642, 40th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11 (Cal. 1913) (lacking this
language).
158, See generally Hearing,supra note 114 (discussing ramifications of the proposed
bill on underground water).
159. See id. at 8-9.
160. See Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 11, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1018.
161. See HICHBORN, supra note 122, at 137-73 (Containing a highly opinionated
discussion of the controversy over the bill, but dealing almost exclusively with the
maneuvering of various factions, rather than with the specifics of the amendment
process). There were two legislative meetings on the bill. Id. at 145, 165. No
transcript or other record of them has been found. But see Franklin Hichborn, Heney
Backs the Water Bill: Conservation Measure Made Subject of Debate Before Senate and Assembly
Committees, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 19, 1913, at 1 (describing the first meeting, held on
March 18, 1913). A letter from W.A. Johnstone, Assemblyman, to Governor Pardee,
dated April 4, 1914, gives the final votes on the bill and a brief discussion of two
proposed Senate amendments (not dealing with groundwater), commenting "[t]hese
are interesting to indicate hidden influences in the consideration of the measure."
Letter from W.A. Johnstone, Assemblyman, to George Pardee, California Governor
(April 4, 1914) (on file with the author).
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seeking to devise their own language to identify the subsurface water
that should be included within the surface water system (and
recognizing, after the previous year's hearing, the difficulty of
fashioning satisfactory language), they simply plugged in familiar
language that was already a part of water law terminology:
"subterranean stream [etc.]." The fact that the Pomeroy approach to
groundwater law had been superceded by the California Supreme
Court in Katz and other decisions discussed above, 62 apparently never
came up in the legislative process. Nor did the fact the Pomeroy
opinion is very confusing, and its intended scope very uncertain (it is
routinely cited as support by both sides in litigation), seem to deter the
legislators. In fact the Pomeroy/Kinney language - so patently inapt,
and inept to us today - seems to have generated not a word of
controversy in a bill that was otherwise so controversial and divisive
that it only became law by virtue of a public referendum. 3
There is nothing in any available documentation of the legislative
history to suggest the draftsmen intended to codify the Pomeroy case,
though they did obviously take language from the opinion. 6 4 Since, as
indicated earlier, Pomeroy had been largely repudiated by later
decisions, and its intent was in any event more than a little uncertain,
the notion it was being "codified" by the adoption of some of its
language is itself a rather fuzzy notion. We simply have no evidence of
whether, or how, the legislators, in adopting the subterranean stream
formula, meant to address the geologic perplexities they were creating
in treating groundwater and surface water as separate entities.
While we cannot know anything for certain, based on what we do
know, the following is the most plausible explanation of legislative
intent.
Once the legislature was persuaded that there were
constitutional problems in creating an integrated system, which is what
the Commission and the Johnstone bill had originally sought; they
reconciled themselves to a bifurcated system, and sought to make sure
that they prevented the most egregious opportunities for people to
subvert the surface water permitting system. The subterranean stream
language of Pomeroy was the only established verbal tool for doing so,
as it clearly covered what had been described in the hearings as "subsurface flow" of surface streams, 66 or what Wiel had earlier described
as a line that would protect streams against pumping that "directly
162. City of Los Angeles v. Hunter, 105 P. 755, 757 (Cal. 1909); Hudson v. Dailey,
105 P. 748, 753 (Cal. 1909); McClintock v. Hudson, 74 P. 849, 850-51 (Cal. 1903); Katz

v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 770-71 (Cal. 1903); Hanson v. McHue, 42 Cal. 303, 309
(1871).
163.

See OFFICE OF SEC'Y OF STATE, AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION AND PROPOSED

STATUTES WITH ARGUMENTS RESPECTING THE SAME, TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE ELECTORs OF

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AT THE GENERAL ELECTION ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 3,

1914

(1914).
164. Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 42, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1033; City of
Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 598 (Cal. 1899).
165. Hunter, 105 P. at 757; Hudson, 105 P. at 753; McClintock, 74 P. at 850-51; Katz, 74
P. at 770-71; Hanson, 42 Cal. at 309.
166. Hearing,supra note 114, at 8-9.
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67
effects a surface flow."

In short, the evidence we have indicates the legislative language
was designed to exclude groundwater generally, except for
groundwater functionally part and parcel of a surface stream - in the
sense that pumping it directly affected surface flow. Probably although there is no evidence one way or another - the legislators
would also have meant to include true subterranean streams, such as
flows in limestone caverns or lava tubes, which would be
"independent" subterranean streams under Kinney's classification.
But even in 1913, it was clear that such features are few and of rare
occurrence in California. 68
The Water Commission legislation was extremely controversial,
though not on the subterranean stream issue. Its far more significant
provisions sought to control monopolization of water by riparian
landowners (a matter that would ultimately be resolved by a
Constitutional Amendment several decades later), 6 ' and to get rid of
unused riparian rights (a provision held unconstitutional, 7 0 but
ultimately achieved by California Supreme Court interpretation). "'
The bill passed the Assembly by a vote of 44-30 ,2 and the Senate
73
version by 28-6.1
The Assembly then
concurred on a 41-10 vote (41
• •
'74
votes being required for passage).
The Governor signed the bill on
June 16, 1913'7 however, it was then subjected to a referendum
following an all-out effort by the law's opponents. California voters
approved the referendum on November 3, 1914, by a margin of 50.7%
to 49.3%.'" It became effective on December 19, 1914.
B. SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Almost as soon as the Water Commission law was enacted,
proposals emerged to revise it and create an integrated management
system for surface and groundwater. As early as 1916, the report of a
legislatively created Water Problems Conference recommended that
groundwater be made appropriable and "placed under the control of
the

State

Water

Commission.'" 77

In

1917,

the

State

Water

167. Id. at 12.

168. CAL.
169. CAL.

47, at 15.
§ 2; Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 622

DEP'TOFWATERRES., supra note

CoNsT., art. X,

(Cal. 1926).
170. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 989
(Cal. 1935).
171. See Rowland v. Ramelli, 599 P.2d 656, 669 (Cal. 1979).
172. HICmORN, supra note 122, at tbl.II.
173. Id. at tbl.I.
174. Id. at tbl.II.
175. Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012.
176. M ACH FONG Eu, OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, A STUDY OF BALLOT MEAsuREs:
1884-1986.
177. STATE WATER PROBLEMS CONFERENCE, REPORT 65 (1916). The report said
[t]he conference therefore has recommended legislation which will
recognize the doctrine of prior appropriation as applied to underground
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Commission's annual report cited "the need of [ground water]

legislation" and opined that:
surface and ground water supplies are so intimately related physically
that one can not be completely regulated and administered without
similar control of the other.... [T]he fact that the water passes
beneath the surface and is for a time hidden from view to again
reappear farther down the stream, does not
1 8 offer a logical reason for
its exemption from control and regulation.
In 1957, the State Water Plan observed that:
[w] hile it is not an immediate problem, it is evident that effective

administration of the development and utilization of ground water
resources, either by the State or by local agencies, or by both, will
become mandatory as the stage of full water development is
approached. When it becomes necessary to operate the major
ground water basins for import-export purposes as envisioned under
The California Water Plan, requisite authority to do so must exist....
The following [item is] suggested for consideration in this
connection: ...The requirement of permits and licenses for the
appropriation of ground water. 7 9
In 1971, the chair of the Assembly Committee on Water made two
very modest legislative proposals: including groundwater in the

existing statutory adjudication procedures, and requiring pumpers
statewide (not just in four southern counties) to file statements of the

amounts they were pumping.180

His suggestions were not enacted.

Two years later, Ronald Robie, a respected water law expert who

became director of the Department of Water Resources (and later a
judge), gave an address in which he said "'ad hoc' solutions are not
satisfactory. I find it curious that although regulation of surface waters

is properly a responsibility of the State, groundwater regulation is
somehow viewed as a 'local' concern.... The result is uncoordinated
administration of interrelatedresources." 181
water, so that the one who first develops it shall be entitled to so much water
as is necessary for the beneficial use of the project to which it is applied.
...[T]he appropriation of underground water, like the appropriation of
surface water, should be placed under the control of the State Water
Commission, but... no owner of land of 160 acres or less, should be
compelled to apply to the Water Commission for permission to develop the
water lying under his own land for use upon that land ....
Id. at 65-66.
178. STATE CONSERVATION COMM'N, 1917 REPORT OF THE CONSERVATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA74 (1917).
179. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., BULLETIN No. 3, TiiE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN 221

(1957).
180. CAL. WATER CODE § 5000(c) (West 1971); Carley V. Porter, What's in the
Legislative Cards for Ground Water, in PROC. OF THE EIGHTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON
GROUND WATER 63, 65-66 (1971).
181. Ronald B. Robie, Carley V. Porter Memorial Luncheon Address, in PROC. OF THE
NiNTi BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON GROUND WATER 137, 146 (Frank T. Bragg ed., 1973).
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Four years later, the background study for the Governor's
Commission to Review California Water Rights Law posed the
questions: "Should permits be required for new wells where critical
groundwater problems exist or are threatened? For new wells in all
basins? For all wells, new and existing, where critical groundwater
problems exist or are threatened? For all wells in all basins?" 's The
Commission itself, however, acknowledged what had become the
political reality when it came to groundwater law reform. After noting
that "[m]ost other western states have integrated groundwater into
state-level appropriation permit systems," it stated that "California's
experience with groundwater management.., differs from that of
other western states. 83 The report therefore concluded "that local
management, if it is properly undertaken, offers the best opportunity
for workable and effective control. 1

1

4

To make clear that it was not

calling for anything like a general permitting system, it said "[t]he
Commission... intends that proposed legislation not require any
unnecessary management actions in areas without critical long-term
overdraft, subsidence, or water quality problems."'8
The Governor's Commission correctly read the political situation
in California. No pleas for integrated management of surface and
groundwater generated statutory change. In a progress update written
in 1988, attorney Kevin O'Brien reported "[t]he California Legislature
has flirted with the concept of ground water management during the
past several legislative sessions. To date, no comprehensive ground
water management legislation has been adopted."'8 '
On the contrary, the legislature made clear its disinclination to
enact comprehensive legislation or to expand the Board's permitting
jurisdiction over groundwater.18 The subterranean stream provision of
section 1200 of the Water Code remains virtually unchanged from
what it was in 1913. 18 Indeed, in a variety of statutory provisions as well
as legislative studies, the legislature's posture toward statewide
groundwater management is unambiguous. For example:

182. ANNE J. SCHNEIDER, GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW,
GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CAL., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 96 (1977).

183. GOVERNOR'S
(1978).
184.

COMMISSION TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT

166

Id. at 166-67.

185. Id. at 167.
186. Kevin M. O'Brien, The Governor's Commission Revisited: Ten Years of Not So Benign
Neglect in California Ground Water Law, in PROC. OF THE SIXTEENTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE
ON GROUND WATER 50 (JohannesJ. DeVries ed., 1988) (citations omitted).
187. A useful, succinct review of legislative activity appears in Anne J. Schneider,
Groundwater Management Options - Vision vs. Reality, Remarks at Forum Sponsored
by the San Francisco Estuary Project, the Water Education Foundation, the
Commonwealth Club of California and Friends of the San Francisco Estuary (Nov. 2,
1999), in WATER RIGHTS, WATER WRONGS: LEARNING FROM THE PAST, LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE 41-46.
188. Compare Water Commission Act of 1913, ch. 586, § 11, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012,
1018, with CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971).
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In 1962, an Assembly Interim Committee Report, concluded
that "[i]n most areas of the State, the key to the solution of
ground water problems lies in local attitudes and political
feasibility."1 9 "Water agencies expressed a strong desire to solve
their problems themselves and to manage ground water basins
locally. The committee agrees that local management is
desirable and... provides simplified solutions
to many of the
90
ground water basin management problems."

In 1984, in legislation granting area-of-origin rights to a variety
of water systems as against future export projects initiated after a
certain date, the legislation was careful to distinguish between
surface water appropriations dated by the time of "applications
[before the Board] to appropriate," and groundwater
appropriations, dated by the time they are "initiated" [outside of
any permitting process].19"

Because the Article containing the area-of-origin law was
codified in the midst of a chapter of the Water Code that deals
with the Board's administrative responsibilities, the legislature
added section 1221, stating "[t] his article shall not be construed
to authorize the board to regulate groundwater in any
,, 192

manner.

The provision that grants the Board authority over general
adjudications of stream systems specifically excludes "an
underground water supply other than a subterranean stream
flowing through known and definite channels." 93
In one instance where it did give authority to adjudicate a river,
the Scott River, including interconnected groundwater, the
legislature specified that the decision was "necessary ... for a

fair and effective judgment of... rights" in that particular river,
but declared it "necessary that the provisions of this section
apply to the Scott River only."'94 Ironically, the studies that led
to the Scott River legislation demonstrate the legislature had
been fully and unambiguously informed of the inadequacies of
the bifurcated (groundwater and surface water) system it had
created.9
189. ASSEM. INTERIM COMM. ON WATER TO THE CAL. LEGISLATURE, GROUND WATER
PROBLEMS IN CALIFORNIA, 26 ASSEM. INTERIM COMM. REP. 8 (1962).

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 46.
CAL. WATERCODE §§ 1215, 1216 (West Supp. 2003).

Id. § 1221.
CAL. WATER CODE § 2500 (West 1971).
CAL. WATER CODE § 2500.5 (West Supp. 2003).

195. CAL. WATER RES. CONTROL BD., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO PETITION
FOR ADJUDICATION, ScoT RIVER, SISKIYOU COUNTY 5-6 (1971).
[Plumping of groundwater as well as underftow reduces the surface flow of
the various streams and the main stem of Scott River .... It became
apparent.., that underground water was an important part of the water
supply problem in the stream system and that in order to properly determine
the rights to water from the stream system, interconnected underground
water should be included.
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Even where the legislature has wanted the Board to act generally
as to groundwater-as with water quality adjudications-it has
been careful to require it to go to court,196 and to defer to local
public agencies."'
Where the legislature wants to include "percolating
groundwater" within the coverage of a statute, it does so
explicitly, as in a law requiring recordation of certain
groundwater extractions. In that law, the definition section says
"'[g]round water' means water beneath the surface of the
ground whether
or not flowing through known and definite
98
channels.

Finally, the legislature has made clear its view that its preferred
way of dealing with groundwater is through local, basin-specific
management, a position it has held quite consistently over many
years.
This brief review makes clear that the legislature has repeatedly
been made aware of the Board's limited jurisdiction over groundwater
under section 1200 of the Water Code, and has shown no inclination
to expand that jurisdiction beyond the legislative goals that led to the
language in the 1913 statute.
IV. HOW SHOULD SECTION 1200 OF THE WATER CODE BE
INTERPRETED?
The above analysis of the Water Commission Act's history reveals
the legislative purpose of the "subterranean stream" provision was to
protect the integrity of the permitting agency's jurisdiction over
surface stream appropriations. The means for achieving that goal was
the prevention of unpermitted pumping of groundwater that
appreciably and directly affected surface stream flows. The authors of
the Act essentially sought to close a loophole that left the permitting
agency powerless when a pumper took water from a subsurface
location and directly impacted the flow of a surface stream. At the
same time, it is clear the legislature did not intend to create permitting
jurisdiction over all groundwater pumping that would in any way, or at
any time, affect surface streams. The statute undoubtedly meant to
leave much tributary groundwater as part of a separate legal regime
outside the permit system being established. While the "subterranean
Id.

See also CAL. WATER RES. CONTROL BD., REPORT ON HYDROGEOLOGIC CONDITIONS,
ScoTr RVER VALLEY, at ii (1975).

196.
197.
198.
12922

CAL. WATERCODE § 2100 (West 1971).

Id.§2101(b).
Id. § 5000(a); see also CAL. WATER CODE § 1005.4 (West Supp. 2003). Section
of the Water Code expresses the public interest in protecting groundwater

basins from critical conditions of overdraft depletion, sea water intrusion, or degraded
water quality, but it is just a declaration of the public interest, not a grant of
jurisdiction to the Board. CAL. WATER CODE § 12922 (West 1992).
199. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750-10756 (West Supp. 2003); ASSEM. INTERIM COMM.
ON WATER, supra note 189, at 47-48.
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stream" language in the Water Commission Act was almost certainly
generated by concern about pumping from areas that were very
proximate to the surface stream, such as what is called underflow or
subflow, the central concern was impact, not proximity.2 01 It should be
kept in mind that modern-day high-powered pumps were not extant at
that time.
My conclusion is that the Assembly designed the legislation to
create an impact test (impact of pumping on surface stream flows),
and to extend the Board's jurisdiction to pumping that has an
appreciable and direct impact upon a surface stream. To be sure, any
test of impact necessarily involves a judgment about the boundaries of
inclusion and exclusion. This is an unwelcome task imposed by any
regime that treats groundwater and surface water separately; although
even in states where groundwater and surface water management is
fully integrated, judgments must be made about the point at which
pumping impacts on surface streams are sufficiently attenuated in time
or impact that they should not be considered. 1 In any event, any such
line drawing represents a policy judgment, not a technical one. Since
the groundwater and surface water within a watershed essentially
constitute a continuum, any test intended to separate one part of the
groundwater from another inescapably requires a judgment that
reflects a purposive goal, rather than reflecting a technical line of
demarcation that hydrogeologists or other scientific experts utilize and
for which there is a technically accepted definition.
It may be objected that an impact test is at odds with the explicit
language of section 1200 of the Water Code, whose terms literally
describe a geographic test, rather than an impact test. 2°2 The statute

would seem to require a search for a definite channel and for flowing
water, etc. Such a geographic test is what the Board has traditionally
applied, searching out the limits of a bed and banks, appraising
whether the water was flowing rather than merely percolating, and
asking whether it was moving parallel to a surface stream, as part of a
definite channel.0 3 While the unambiguous meaning of statutory
200. Basing jurisdiction on impact, in light of modern pumping capacity, would
expand the Board's authority beyond its traditional extent. That would raise the
question of how to deal with longstanding unregulated uses, unless they were
grandfathered.
201. For example, both Colorado and New Mexico use a time-based maximum
interference test to identify wells that are sufficiently remote in impact that they do not
need to be actively administered in the prior appropriation system. See also Hubbard v.
Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 936 P.2d 27, 28 (Wash. 1997).
202. The Arizona Supreme Court took the same view of a similar interpretative
question under its groundwater law. In re Gen. Adjudication of the Gila River Sys., 857
P.2d 1236, 1245 (Ariz. 1993).
203. A 1999 State Water Resources Control Board decision illustrates a
contemporary case in which the Board determines whether a subterranean stream is
present. In re Application 29664, Decision 1639, 1999 WL 458786, at *1 to *13 (Cal.
State Water Res. Control Bd. June 17, 1999). A 1926 decision is typical of older cases.
In re Application No. 3883, Decision D. 119, at 7-14 (Cal. Div. Of Water Rights, Aug.
24, 1926). Although a recent Board decision holds to the traditional Pomeroy
approach, a recent draft order has a somewhat more generous interpretive stance.
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language should prevail over efforts to decipher legislative history, it
can hardly be thought that the meaning of the words in section 1200
are unambiguous, though the terms themselves-like channel,
flowing, and stream-seem clear enough. The problem is that the
words used in this statute describe a legal fiction. With only the rarest
exceptions, there is no "flowing" water underground in California, and
nothing that meets the ordinary notion of a stream. Ground water
percolates through earth, which is more and less porous. Nor can it be
concluded that the legislature "clearly" intended to codify some
particular definition embodied in the Pomeroy case, since lawyers have
unceasingly disputed, for nearly a century, the meaning of the
complicated and confusing decision in that case."' Thus, conventional
canons of construction in interpreting statutory language do not fit the
circumstances of section 1200 of the Water Code.
Sometimes statutes use words that are unambiguous in themselves,
and that have a literal meaning, but where that meaning plainly does
not describe legislative intent. Perhaps the most notable example is
found in a United States Supreme Court decision in which an
individual sought to stake a claim on groundwater under federal
mining laws, claiming the mining law covered every "valuable
mineral," and that groundwater was-unambiguously-a valuable
mineral.2 5 The Court sensibly held that in this instance Congress did
not mean what it had literally said: it was indisputable that the valuable
mineral of water was not meant to be appropriated under the law that
governs gold, silver, and other such valuable minerals 0 The extant
history of the Water Commission Act is similarly persuasive as to the
gap between usual literal meaning and legislative intent. Here the
purpose of the provision in question was to insulate surface stream
flows from those groundwater diversions that would have a direct and
significant impact on the surface stream, rather than to seek out some
particular configuration of water as it moved underneath the earth's
surface.
V. EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR MANAGEMENT OF
GROUNDWATER OUTSIDE WATER CODE SECTION 1200
While section 1200 of the Water Code has been the centerpiece of
legal dispute concerning administrative jurisdiction over groundwater,
that provision is not the only source of Board jurisdiction over
groundwater. Conversely, even a very expansive interpretation of
section 1200 would not bring all groundwater under Board authority.
Two important qualifications must be added to any discussion of the
scope of section 1200 of the Water Code. First, even if the definition
Compare Decision 1645, supra note 39, at *1 to *4, with In re Permit 14853, Draft Order

WRO 2003, at 10-13 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter
SWRCB Draft Order].
204. See supra text accompanying notes 31-40.
205. Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 605-06 (1978).

206. Id. at 614.
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of a subterranean stream were very expansively interpreted, the
Board's permitting jurisdiction would still not embrace uses of that
water on overlying land. Second, there are other potentially available
sources of Board authority over the use of subsurface water, outside of
section 1200's permitting jurisdiction.
A. OVERLYING USES OF GROUNDWATER
Land overlying a subterranean stream is considered riparian to
that stream,2 °7 and it has always been understood that "[a] riparian is
entitled to pump and use water on a parcel which overlies a
subterranean stream" just like a rparian on a surface stream, without
seeking a permit from the Board.
While there is no authoritative source of data as to how much
groundwater is used on overlying riparian land, and how much is
being applied to non-overlying land, there is little doubt that a
considerable percentage of groundwater is being used on riparian
overlying land. Thus, it would be outside the Board's permitting
jurisdiction, no matter how expansively the statutory category of
"subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels"
was applied. The following estimates, provided by the Association of
California Water Agencies ("ACWA") in response to an inquiry by the
author of this article, give a rough sense of the scope of the issue:
For example, in Ventura County, the total groundwater pumping is
about 70% agricultural and 30% municipal and industrial (M&I). It
can be assumed that essentially all the M&I usage is not overlying....
Assuming that some of the agricultural pumping is not overlying,
then the total non-overlying usage could rise to at least 50%....
Of course, this will vary considerably by county. Its likely that a
county in the northern Sacramento Valley could have the highest
percentage of overlying land use whereas urban counties such as Los
Angeles or Orange could have the lowest percentage. Again, this is
all very theoretical and conditions could dramatically vary for each
and every country in California. 9

207. "An overlying right, [is] analogous to that of the riparian owner in a surface
stream." Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000). See also Prather
v. Hoberg, 150 P.2d 405, 410 (Cal. 1944); WELLsA. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAw OF
All the usual limits on riparian diversion and use
WATER RIGHTS 421 (1956).

presumably apply to subterranean stream riparians as to those riparian to a surface
stream-use is limited to natural flows, must be within the watershed, and no seasonal
storage is permitted. As to the extent of overlying rights, it is "the owner's right to take
water from the ground underneath for use on his land within the basin or watershed."
Barstow, 5 P.3d at 863.
208. See In reAmended Application 27614, Decision 1632, 1995 WL 464946, at *12 to
*14 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. July 6, 1995) [hereinafter Decision 1632].
Riparian pumpers of percolating groundwater do not have to file the statements of
diversion and use to which surface riparians are subject. CAL. WATER CODE § 5101
(West Supp. 2003). See the definition of diversion. Id. § 5100(b) (West 1971).
209. Letter from Stephen K. Hall, Exec. Dir., ACWA, to Joseph Sax, Professor of Law
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Whatever the actual numbers, it is significant that concerns about
non-regulation of groundwater use are not attributable solely to
restrictions imposed under interpretations of section 1200 of the
Water Code, and that expanded interpretation of that statutory
provision would primarily affect municipal and industrial users of
groundwater, rather than agricultural pumpers.
B. OTHER SOURCES OF AUTHORITY OVER USE OF GROUNDWATER
1. California Constitution Article X, Section 2, California Water
Code Section 100, the Public Trust, and California Water
Code Section 275
While section 1200 of the Water Code limits the Board's
permitting jurisdiction over groundwater, it does not limit other
sources of authority that may be available to the Board to regulate uses
of groundwater. A lively current question is whether, and to what
extent, the Board may restrict pumping of percolating groundwater
that is adversely affecting surface instream benefits, such as fish
populations and riparian values. The Board's attorneys are of the view
the Board has authority to control such uses where they either: (1)
violate the prohibition of the Constitution and the Water Code on
waste and on unreasonable use and methods of use; or (2) violate the
public trust.
Both jurisdictional and substantive issues arise. In terms of
jurisdiction, there are two distinct issues. First, does the Board have
authority to take jurisdiction itself, and to issue remedial orders against
users water users over whom it has no permitting authority?210 Second,
may the Board go to court and seek judicial relief? Substantively, what
constitutes waste and unreasonable use in the context of groundwater
use that affects surface stream values, and does the public trust extend
to groundwater uses at all? 211 Since this article deals only with the
Board's permitting and regulatory jurisdiction, the following
discussion is limited to that issue, not with the questions regarding
what constitutes waste and unreasonable use, or what constitutes a
212
violation of the public trust.
1 (Oct. 31, 2001) (on file with the author).
210. While the question here relates to users of percolating groundwater, a parallel
question arises as to riparian surface water users, and pre-1914 appropriators.
211. Cf in re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000) (Waizihole
Ditch case) (extending public trust to groundwater). An unresolved question in
California is whether pumping of tributary groundwater that affects public trust values
in navigable waters would be treated like tributary surface water under Nat'l Audubon
Socy v. Superior Court. 658 P.2d 709, 712, 721 (Cal. 1983).
212. The scope of the Board's public trust authority is a subject of considerable
dispute. See, e.g., David R.E. Aladjem, Is Water Ripe for the Taking? The SWRCB's Lower
Yuba River Decision and the Public Trust Doctrine, 11 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 261-65
(July 2001) (criticizing In re Fishery Res. & Water Right Issues of the Lower Yuba River,
Decision 1644, 2001 WL 1880742 (Cal. State Water Res. Bd. March 1, 2001)) (petitions
for reconsideration and petitions for writ of administrative mandamus pending). See
generally Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text and Context, 27
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Assuming that a substantive violation exists, there is no doubt 3
that the Board, through the California Attorney General," 4 can
institute litigation to control groundwater use that: (1) constitutes
waste, unreasonable use, or method of use within the meaning of
article X, section 2 of the California Constitution, and section 100 of
the Water Code; 2 1 or (2) violates the public trust.21 6 An Arizona case
filed, but not decided on the merits, asserted the Arizona Department
of Water Resources has an affirmative duty to use the public trust to
protect the state's watercourses from adverse affects of groundwater
pumping.217 However, there may still be some question whether the
Board can assert its own jurisdiction to adjudicate and remedy
complaints about groundwater control where it otherwise has no
jurisdiction over the respondent,2 18 though the California Supreme
Court said that claims of unreasonable uses of water or of harm to the
public trust "may be brought in the courts or before the Board.21 9
Board jurisdiction in such situations is said to be founded primarily
on section 275 of the Water Code,22° secondarily on section 174 of the
ARIz. ST. L.J. 1155, 1173 (1995).
213. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1980)
[hereinafter EDF II]; State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 858
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976). Courts may require the parties to accept a physical solution to
resolve a waste problem. City of Lodi v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 450 (Cal.
1936).
214. CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West Supp. 2003). Also the Attorney General can
bring an action for equitable relief "for the protection of the natural resources of the
state from pollution, impairment, or destruction." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12607 (West
1992). For definition of "natural resources" see id. § 12605.
215. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 851-58 (discussing Board suit brought under section 275
of the Water Code to enjoin riparian uses as unreasonable). The prohibition on
unreasonable and non-beneficial use applies to groundwater as well as surface water
use. Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 893 (Cal. 1967); Peabody v. City of
Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 494 (Cal. 1935).
216. "Members of the public" have standing to bring an action to restrain violations
of the public trust. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971); see also Cal. State
Water Res. Control Bd. v. United States, 749 P.2d 324, 338 n.16 (Cal. 1988). The State
acting through the Board has a continuing responsibility and authority under the
public trust doctrine to consider the effect of water diversions upon public trust
resources and to avoid or minimize harm to those resources to the extent feasible.
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 723 (finding a duty of continuing supervision).
Preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources, and recreation, as well as
the public interest in water, are statutory responsibilities of the Board. CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 1243, 1253 (West 1971).

217. See generally Plaintiff's Complaint, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Smith, No.
CV2002-000171 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa County filed on Jan. 7, 2002). The court
later consolidated this case with others in Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. Katz, CASA-02-0168, 1 CA-SA 02-0177, 1 CA-SA 02-0178, but the Arizona Supreme Court denied
certiorari on March 21, 2003.
218. It may be important to distinguish the Board's ability to go to court from its
ability to assert jurisdiction itself, and to issue orders restraining groundwater use.
Sometimes the term 'jurisdiction" is used without making this distinction explicit. See,
e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Legal Disconnections Between Surface Water and Ground
Water, in MAKING THE CONNECTIONS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH BIENNIAL
CONFERENCE ON GROUND WATER 21 (Johannes DeVries &JeffWoled eds., 1996).

219.
220.

Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 749 P.2d at 338 n.16.
"The department [and board] shall take all appropriate proceedings or actions
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Water Code,22" ' and perhaps on substantive provisions article X,
section 2 of the California Constitution, which is self-executing, and on
its statutory parallel, section 100 of the Water Code. There is one
California Fourth District Court of Appeal decision directly on point,
though it did not involve groundwater.
In Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control Board
("I1D II'), the issue was whether the Board could take jurisdiction over
pre-1914 surface water appropriations in order to determine whether
the water was being unreasonably used in violation of article X,
section 2 of the Constitution, or whether a complainant would have to
go to court to raise and adjudicate such a claim 2 The argument was
that the Board had no pre-existing jurisdiction over the Imperial
Irrigation District's ("IID") pre-1914 appropriations; and that the
statutory provision upon which the Board relied was not a grant of
jurisdiction to it, but simply an authorization to the Board to go to
court to seek relief. The provision in question was section 275 of the
Water Code. IID claimed this provision was a restriction on the
Board-directing it to petition other agencies to grant relief for
violations-rather than a grant ofjurisdiction to act on its own.22 ' Even
if such a claim were to prevail, however, courts have broad authority to
refer any and all issues to the Board. 4
The court expressly rejected IDD's claim, and said it saw no
distinction between the IID II case and an earlier case, Environmental
Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District ("EDF I').225

EDF I

sustained Board jurisdiction over a claim of waste and unreasonable
use under section 275 of the Water Code.2 6 However in that case, the
Board already had jurisdiction over the water user, one of its
permittees. 227 Similarly, in the National Audubon Society Mono Lake
before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent waste, unreasonable use,
unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water in this
State." CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 1971).
221. "The Legislature hereby finds and declares that in order to provide for the
orderly and efficient administration of the water resources of the state it is necessary to
establish a control board which shall exercise the adjudicatory and regulatory
functions of the state in the field of water resources." Id. § 174; see also id. §§ 104, 105.
222. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) [hereinafter 1ID II].
223. Id. at 255-56.
224. "[I]n any lawsuit for a determination of rights to water, 'the court may order a
reference to the Board, as referee, of any or all issues,' or, alternatively, 'may refer the
suit to the board for investigation of and report upon any or all of the physical facts
involved.' " Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 749 P.2d at 338 n.16 (citations omitted).
225. IID II, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.4.
226. Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 572 P.2d 1128, 1136-37 (Cal. 1978)
[hereinafter EDF I]. See also Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 10
(Cal. 1980) [hereinafter EDF II].
227. The EDF II case, where the court held the Board has jurisdiction to determine
whether a water user's failure to reclaim water violated the Water Reclamation Law,
dealt not only with the use of water held under a Board permit, but with a statute that
expressly granted the Board jurisdiction to regulate reclamation and use of waste
water. Such cases essentially raise primary jurisdiction, or concurrent jurisdiction,
issues, rather than dealing with the question whether there is Board jurisdiction at all.
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case, which began in court, not before the Board, Los Angeles was
already within the Board's jurisdiction before the public trust claim
arose. 228
The Imperial IrrigationDistrict v. State Water Resources Control Board
("liD I") decision says that "[n]o case has construed section 275 as a
limitation on the Board's adjudicatory power. In fact, EDF , which
holds the Board had exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction ...

cites section

275 in support of its conclusion the Board's 'powers extend to
regulation of water quality and prevention of waste.' 22 9 The court in
lID Irelied in addition on the so-called Racanelli decision, 3 ° which also
cited section 275 of the Water Code as authority for the proposition
that the Board has "the separate and additional power to take whatever
steps are necessary to prevent unreasonable use or methods of
diversion."2

3

'

The court in ID I concluded "section 275 is not to be

construed as a limitation on the Board's adjudicatory authority, but
2 2
rather as a statute granting separate, additional power to the Board."
The California Supreme Court has not yet expressly addressed the
question whether section 275 of the Water Code provides an
independent source of jurisdiction over pumpers of percolating
groundwater. However, the holding in ID I, along with the language
of EDFIand the Racanelli decision, are significant authority in favor of
the claim that the Board can assert jurisdiction over percolating
groundwater pumping to adjudicate and remedy claims that come
within the scope of waste and unreasonable use covered by section 275
of the Water Code. Such jurisdiction could be a powerful tool to deal
with pumping that impairs instream flows needed to protect fish and
riparian values, one of the major issues underlying complaints urging
the Board to take a broadened view of its jurisdiction under section
1200 of the Water Code.2 3
Of course, lID I is a court of appeals case, not a supreme court
The Board and the courts have concurrentjurisdiction. EDFII,605 P.2d at 10.
228.

Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 723, 728-29 (Cal. 1983);

In reApplications No. 29919, Decision 1635, 1996 WL 904701, at *12 to *13 (Cal. State
Water Res. Bd. Oct. 2,1996).
229. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 231 Cal. Rptr. 283, 289
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (citing EDFI, 572 P.2d at 1136) [hereinafter ID I].

230. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 195 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986). While there is language in the Racanelli decision that is very broad-the
court says the Board has independent jurisdiction to implement the Constitutional

provision against unreasonable use-this statement was made in the context of a party
holding a Board permit, and the Board was only amending the permit terms. Id. at
187. It did not seek to use an unreasonable use claim to create jurisdiction where it
did not otherwise exist.
231. 1ID I, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (quoting State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. at
195).

232. Id.
233. It should be noted that the Board's limited ability to gather information or
perform monitoring, or to require diverters to report and monitor, significantly
constrains its practical capacity to implement section 275 of the Water Code and the

public trust. Broad substantive authority may be undermined by its inability to obtain
sufficient evidence to sustain a claim. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1051 (West 1971).
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decision, and it deals with surface water. It remains to be seen if the
supreme court's language in EDF I will be applied to groundwater,
where there is no pre-existing Board jurisdiction. No doubt the claim
will be made that percolating groundwater is a special case, and that
the legislature has taken special pains to restrict Board jurisdiction
over groundwater, specifying those (few) instances in which it believes
such jurisdiction may be exercised.3
In anticipation of any such
claim, however, one should recall that back in 1912 and 1913 the only
expressed objection to jurisdiction over groundwater arose over a
discretionary permitting system that could deny a landowner
appropriation of water despite an adequate supply. 2" Both the
supreme court and legislature acknowledged, even then, that when
groundwater pumping adversely affected other water rights, pumping
could be regulated and restricted.3 6
The scope of Board jurisdiction over groundwater to protect
instream values was questioned in North Gualala Water Company v. State
Water Resources Control Board.5 7 In that case, the Board had jurisdiction
over a surface appropriation, which was conditioned by a bypass flow
provision. The permittee then sought a permit (presumably out of an
abundance of caution) to change the point of diversion to a well, while
simultaneously asserting the well did not pump subterranean stream
water, and that the stream was not recharging it anyway.238 The Board
nonetheless insisted on maintaining the bypass flow condition on the
well, and declined to adjudicate the subterranean stream question,

234. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1005.4, 1215, 1216, 2500.5 (West 2003); id. §
12922 (West 1992); id. §§ 2100, 2101(b), 2500, 5000(a) (West 1971).
235. Cf Hearing,supra note 114, at 21, 25-26.
236. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771-72 (Cal. 1903) (declaring the doctrine of
correlative rights to govern groundwater pumping in California); Water Commission Bill,
supra note 106, §§ 13, 15, 17.
237. Plaintiffis Complaint, N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No.
SCUK CVG 01 86 109 (Super. Ct. Cal. Mendocino County filed July 19, 2001). The
case has a complicated history. See In re Permit 14853, Order WR 2001-14, 2001 WL
1880726 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. June 21, 2001) [hereinafter Order 200114]; In re Petitions for Reconsideration by Coast Action Group, Order WR 99-011, 1999
WL 1333373 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Nov. 18, 1999) [hereinafter Order 99011]; In re Minor Protested Petition to Change Permits 5431, Order WR 99-09-DWR,
1999 WL 33512265 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Aug. 27, 1999). On June 21,
2001, the Board issued an Order Denying Reconsideration in the North Gualala Water
Company case. Order 2001-14, supra, at *7. The Order deals with the procedural
failings of the petition for reconsideration. But the Order notes the Company claims
its pumping is not affecting the surface flow, as well as that it is not pumping from a
subterranean stream. Id. at *4. If there is no hydraulic connection between the
pumping and the surface flows, then the case would become moot (there would be no
need to apply stream flow maintenance standards to these wells). Id. at *5. If,
however, there, is a connection, and if it is determined that the Company is not
pumping from a subterranean stream-an issue that the June 21 Order leaves open
for later consideration-the question remains whether, and how, the Board would
seek to control the pumping in order to protect instream flows. Id. at *7. As of the
time of this writing, a new draft order had been issued by the Board finding that the
water is a subterranean stream. SWRCB Draft Order, supra note 203.
238. N. Gualala Water Co., No. SCUK CVG 01 86 109, at 4.
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saying that issue was not properly before it.239 Nonetheless, the Board
made clear its understanding that it had jurisdiction whether or not
the well in question is pumping subterranean stream water. 240 The
applicant filed suit in superior court seeking a determination that it
was not pumping subterranean stream water and that the Board had
no jurisdiction over its well. 41 The case potentially presented a most
interesting issue: if the facts showed that the new point of diversion,
the well, was pumping tributary groundwater with virtually the same
impact on instream values as the previous surface diversion, but that
legally the well was pumping percolating groundwater, has the Board
now lostjurisdiction over the diversion? If so, could it take jurisdiction
The most recent
anew under section 275 of the Water Code?
development, as this article was being written, was a new draft order by
the Board (cited above) finding the water in question was a
subterranean stream. 4 ' The North Gualala Water Co. case, or one like it,
will eventually work its way through the courts and clarify the scope of
the Board's asserted independent authority over percolating
groundwater that threatens surface stream values in violation of the
values protected under section 275 of the Water Code.
2. Remedies for Impairment of Water Rights
While California does not have an integrated permit system for
administering surface and groundwater use, the California courts have
protected surface stream rights against groundwater pumping, and vice

239. Order 2001-14, supra note 237, at *4.
240. The Board's order states the following:
Under article X, section 2 of the California Constitution and Water Code
section 100, however, all diversion and use of water in California is subject to

reasonable use restrictions and a prohibition on unreasonable diversion or

method of diversion. Adverse impacts to fish and wildlife are among the

factors that provide a basis for determining that a water diversion may be
unreasonable. Water Code section 275 directs the SWRCB to take all
appropriate actions to prevent waste or unreasonable use and unreasonable
methods of diversion. The SWRCB's authority to regulate water use to
comply with the reasonable use and diversion requirements of the California
Constitution and Water Code extends to water use under all types of rights.

Thus, the SWRCB's authority to require the operator of a well to prepare a
water supply contingency plan to avoid or reduce impacts on public trust
resources is not limited to situations where the well is deemed to be under the
SWRCB's permitting authority.
Order99-011, supra note 237, at *4 n.3 (citations omitted). Elsewhere in the Order, the
Board says it "has the continuing responsibility and authority under the public trust
doctrine to consider the effect of water diversions upon public trust resources and to
avoid or minimize harm to those resources to the extent feasible." Id. at *4 (citing

Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 726-28 (Cal. 1983)). It should
be noted, incidentally, that since salmon in the river were listed under the federal
Endangered Species Act, the pumpers might have been liable for a "take" under that
law, whether or not the Board had jurisdiction over them. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)

(2000).
241.

N. Gualala Water Co., No. SCUK CVG 01 86 109, at *8.

242. SWRCB Draft Order, supra note 203, at 3.
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versa, at the behest of the injured party, for nearly a century.2" For43
example, in a 1904 case, Cohen v. La Canada Land & Water Company,
the California Supreme Court protected a prior appropriator from a
surface stream against a subsequent appropriator of tributary
percolating groundwater. 44 Similarly in City of Lodi v. East Bay
Municipal Utility District, the court protected a prior appropriator of
percolating groundwater against a subsequent appropriator of surface
stream water.
In a 1903 decision, a riparian surface stream user was protected
against an appropriator of percolating groundwater. 246 The court also
protected Los Angeles' paramount pueblo rights in the Los Angeles
River against diminution by pumping of tributary percolating
groundwater. 47 Still, another early case applied the correlative rights
doctrine as between a riparian user of a surface stream and an
overlying user of tributary groundwater. 48
The effective result of all these cases has been to implement
integrated management of water rights, in hydraulically connected
groundwater and surface stream water, through the medium of private
litigation. 24' Needless to say, the courts also collectively manage surface
water rights with subterranean stream water uses and have, for
example, protected a senior surface appropriator against a junior
pumper.2 50 Indeed, it may be that the determination of the California
243. Eckel v. Springfield Tunnel & Dev. Co., 262 P. 425, 428 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1927); McClintock v. Hudson, 74 P. 849, 850-51 (Cal. 1903). Miller v. Bay Cities Water
Co., 107 P. 115, 125 (Cal. 1910), cited in City of Lodi v. E. Bay. Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d
439, 449 (Cal. 1936).
244. 76 P. 47, 48-49 (Cal. 1904). The court's legal posture in this case is not entirely
clear, as it does not describe the defendant (pumper of percolating groundwater used
off the overlying land) as simply an appropriator, junior to the plaintiff (surface steam
appropriator), but says that a use other than on the pumper's own land is "not for a
reasonable use" Id.
245. 60 P.2d at 440, 447, 452.
246. McClintock, 74 P. at 849, 851.
247. City of Los Angeles v. Hunter, 105 P. 755, 757 (Cal. 1909).
248. Hudson v. Dailey, 105 P. 748, 752-53 (Cal. 1909). The court made clear that
correlative rights would apply whether the groundwater was percolating or was a
subterranean stream. Id. at 753. The Eckel court followed this holding. Eckel, 262 P. at
427.
249. See United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 806, 847 (S.D. Cal.
1958). The Fallbrookcourt cited numerous California cases, and noted:
[A] percolating groundwater supply, although not part of the flow of a
stream, may nevertheless be hydrologically connected with it, with the result
that the extraction of water from either source diminishes the amount of
water in the other. In such a situation, the percolating groundwater and the
stream are regarded as one common water supply; and in considering the
respective rights of those who secure water from the two interconnected
sources, it is "immaterial whether the [underground] waters... were or were
not part of an underground stream, provided the fact be established that this
exaction from the ground diminished to that extent, or to some substantial
extent, the water flowing in the stream.
Id. at 847 (citations omitted) (quoting McClintock, 74 P. at 851).
250. Larsen v. Apollonio, 55 P.2d 196, 198 (Cal. 1936); Barton Land & Water Co. v.
Crafton Water Co., 152 P. 48, 51 (Cal. 1915).
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Supreme Court to integrate groundwater and surface water rights in
litigation explains, at least in part, how California law has been able to
endure the "non-administration" of groundwater under section 1200
of the Water Code for so many decades.
Nor need all such cases be remitted to private litigation. The
Board clearly has and uses its authority to protect groundwater uses
when it hasjurisdiction over permit applications to appropriate surface
water.251 The Board protects groundwater users dependent on
recharge from surface streams by determining whether surface water is
available for appropriation.
The Board also has authority to
condition surface stream appropriation permits to protect
groundwater rights. 253 The courts, of course, can also afford such
protection in private litigation.254
VI. A LAST FEW WORDS: WHAT DOES ALL THIS HISTORY
SIGNIFY FOR TODAY'S PROBLEMS?
Plainly section 1200 of the Water Code is a relic from another
time, and it is hard to imagine any legislature enacting it today.25 5 Yet
251. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1253, 1255, 1257 (West 1971).
252. In two decisions, for example, the Board has created permit conditions
designed to protect prior rights to divert from percolating groundwater (in both cases
Condition 11). In re Permits 10657, Order WR 81-11, 1981 WL 40368, *1 (Cal. State
Water Res. Bd. Sept. 17, 1981); In re Applications 24578, Decision 1486, 1978 WL
21156, at *3, *14 (Cal. State Water Res. Bd. Sept. 25, 1978). In a decision involving a
stream tributary to Pismo Creek in San Luis Obispo County, the Board said:
In order to issue a permit, the Board must find that unappropriated water is
available to supply the applicant. Unappropriated water includes water that
has not been either previously appropriated or diverted for riparian use. The
owner of land overlying a groundwater basin, which is fed by percolation from
a surface watercourse, possesses rights analogous to a riparian owner.
Consequently, water is not available for appropriation from a watercourse
which feeds a groundwater basin if the appropriation would materially
damage the rights of the overlying landowners.
In re Application 28883, Decision 1627, 1990 WL 264522, at *3 (Cal. State Water Res.
Bd. Nov. 27, 1990) (citations omitted).
253. E.g., City of Lodi v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 441-42 (Cal. 1936). "In
the permits of the District ... it was specifically provided that the District was under
the responsibility of not injuring the underground water users, downstream from the
dam." Id.
254. E.g., Miller v. Bay Cities Water Co., 107 P. 115, 122-25 (Cal. 1910) (prohibiting
an appropriation of surface waters where the appropriation would have reduced
groundwater recharge necessary to support the use of an overlying user of percolating
groundwater).
255. Knowledgeable authorities agree the "right" system is one that integrates
management of hydrologically connected ground and surface waters. "Where ... the
stream and the groundwater are so closely connected that the use of one affects the
other, the same law must be applied to both sources." John D. Leshy & James
Belanger, Arizona Law Where Ground and Surface Water Meet, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 657, 658-59
(1988) (quoting FrankJ. Trelease, Conjunctive Use of Groundwaterand Surface Water, 27
RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1853, 1856 (1982)). The National Water Commission also
recommended:
State laws should recognize and take account of the substantial interrelation
of surface water and ground water. Rights in both sources of supply should be
integrated, and uses should be administered and managed conjunctively.
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it remains the law in California, and, as described above, the
legislature shows no inclination to change it. In any event, after all
these years, there would be no easy way to comprehensively bring
groundwater under the permitting regime that governs surface water.
For example:
-

-

-

A great deal of subsurface water has been pumped for a long
time, and any comprehensive permitting system would have to
address such perplexing questions as whether a long-standing
pumper would be integrated with surface appropriators of the
same date, or be treated as a new appropriator, as of the date of
a newly required permit application?
Would permitting requirements be applied to adjudicated
groundwater rights, and to established groundwater banking
programs?
Since a considerable percentage of pumped groundwater is
used on overlying land and is thus riparian, it would therefore
be outside any revised permitting system, unless overlying
groundwater use was to be treated differently from riparian
surface water use.

In light of these difficulties and the greater power of modern
pumps, I suggest a practical approach, taking note of the new
information about the intended legislative purpose of section 1200 of
the Water Code, along the following lines:
-

-

Adoption by the Board of clear criteria to implement the
existing statutory purpose, by taking jurisdiction over new
groundwater uses that would diminish appreciably and directly
the flow of a surface stream, substituting an impact test for a
geographic one; and
Proactive use by the Board of its authority under section 275 of
the Water Code, and any other sources of jurisdiction it has, to
implement
the constitutional
prohibitions
on waste,
unreasonable use, and unreasonable methods of use; to protect
the public trust; and to safeguard established rights in surface

There should not be separate codifications of surface water law and ground
water law; the law of waters should be a single, integrated body of
jurisprudence.
NAT'L WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FuTuRE 233 (1973).
256. Priority is ordinarily based on the date of filing of a permit application. CAL.
WATER CODE § 1225 (West Supp. 2003); id. §§ 1450, 1455 (West 1971). However, the
Board has the authority to adjust the priorities of water right applicants. United States
v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The
Board has adjusted priorities in the public interest where junior applicants had
longstanding claims and uses within the groundwater basin. Decision 1632, supra note
208, at *32 to *33. It might have authority to prefer existing users to new applicants,
notwithstanding the application date, and perhaps grant priorities to existing pumpers
who are new applicants that reflect their actual date of beginning pumping.
Nonetheless, settling priorities would be a deeply troublesome issue.
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stream flows; and
Where
serious
basin-wide
problems
are
presented,
comprehensive basin management (as with successful examples
of adjudicated/managed Southern California basins) 257 as the
most promising tool to achieve genuine integration of surface
water and groundwater administration in California. This
suggestion is made in full recognition of the cost, duration, and
complexity usually associated with settling fights generally
within a basin. 258 Nonetheless, that approach will best position
California to address contemporary groundwater/surface-water
issues such as professional administration,
pumping
assessments, importation of new supplies, replenishment
programs, achievement of sustainable use, allocation of
groundwater storage capacity, quality control, and conjunctive
use.

257. See generally BLOMQUIST, supra note 3, at 17-20.
258. A task that has not been made easier by a recent California Supreme Court
decision. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000).

